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When faced with any type of irregular warfare, technology integration has proved 
to be problematic for developed countries with technologically advanced militaries. 
Developed countries train and equip their militaries and develop military doctrines that 
tend to focus on protection from other developed countries. Thus, these military agencies 
are well prepared for conventional warfare and assume they can use the same operational 
concepts against irregular adversaries as well. Unfortunately, this theory has proved 
incorrect. History suggests that developed countries rely on the most advanced 
technologies to provide an advantage in all operations; however, high-tech does not 
always equate to right-tech. Through three related case studies, this thesis analyzes how 
strong actors use varying levels of technology to engage weak actors in irregular warfare, 
and how the misuse of technology can lead to defeat rather than victory for the “strong” 
actors. I suggest that advanced militaries should develop technology strategies for 
irregular warfare that are based on tailored capabilities. Additionally, these agencies need 
processes that promote tactical and technological innovation to fill operational gaps in 
their capabilities for waging irregular warfare. 
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In its 2001 transformation study report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) called for a makeover of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) “technology 
application . . . through which significant gains in operational effectiveness, operating 
efficiencies and cost reductions [could be] achieved.”1 The report concluded that the U.S. 
military was essentially stuck in an archaic, conventional mindset regarding the use of 
technology in warfare. The OSD called for effectiveness through a change in technology 
capability based on operational environment and efficiency to reduce resources or 
manpower without decreasing capability.2 Yet, after more than a decade of the war on 
terror, the United States is still wrestling with the problem of properly employing the 
correct level of technology in irregular conflicts. National and operational strategies have 
yet to address the complexity of irregular warfare, and the use of weapons technology 
largely remains conventional. Over the past fourteen years, weapons employment has 
drastically changed as each military branch sought to modernize its force. This has 
translated into increases in advanced technology in an effort to limit collateral damage. 
However, this study argues that the improvements in technology have not actually 
increased capability or effectiveness but, only increased operating cost. Thus, 
technological considerations in strategy are needed to ensure there is an increase in 
capability and effectiveness as well. In other words, “right-tech” solutions in irregular 
warfare may prove more important than high-tech ones. 
A. TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
Throughout the campaign since 9/11, the United States has employed largely 
conventional strategies of engagement against irregular actors in Afghanistan and Iraq.3 
                                                 
1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Transformation Study Report: Transforming Military 
Operational Capabilities (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (April 27, 2001), 5. 
2 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011). This publication defines effectiveness and the 
application of technology to increase effectiveness in the executive summary.  
3 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “US Plans Shift to Elite Units as it Winds Down in Afghanistan,” 
New York Times, February 4, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/asia/us-plans-a-shift-to-
elite-forces-in-afghanistan.html. 
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This approach, as outlined in the U.S. national strategy and DOD publications, has driven 
the implementation and overuse of high-tech solutions.4 Prior to September 2001, both 
the DOD and the Bush administration focused on using technological improvements such 
as precision-guided munitions to destroy international terrorist organizations. True to its 
conventional strategy, the United States purchased the latest cutting-edge technology 
with the goal of gaining an immediate advantage over its opponents.5 However, the past 
fifteen years have demonstrated that the United States would not predominantly be 
dealing with a conventional enemy in the near term, highlighting the need to weigh 
conventional and irregular warfare considerations with regard to technological strategic 
approaches.  
After four years of operating under a conventional strategy in an irregular 
conflict, the Bush administration updated the National Security Strategy in 2006, citing a 
lack of success on the battlefield as the reason for change.6 However, sophisticated and 
precision technology remained the principal means of defeating opponents, placing 
emphasis on the importance of using high-tech means in warfare.7 Following multiple 
years of military and technology surge strategies, in 2009 former Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates assessed the United States’ opponents’ war-fighting strategy: 
The categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes. 
We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—from the 
sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid and 
more complex forms of warfare.8 
                                                 
4 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President, 2002), 30. 
5 Frank G. Hoffman, “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs,” Orbis 50, 
no. 3 (2006): 396.  
6 Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President, 2010), 1–9. 
7 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A 
Strategy for Today; a Vision for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004).  
8 Robert M. Gates, “Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign 
Affairs. January/February, 2009, 28. (accessed 1 June, 2015),  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/united-states/2009-01-01/balanced-strategy. 
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Yet, in 2010 the National Security strategy continues to emphasize technology 
development, and does not mention developing an effective technology strategy for this 
complex environment.9 
Philip Towle recognized that “the struggle [of developing an effective irregular 
warfare strategy] revolves around technology to a greater extent than in the past.”10 He 
also suggests that strong actors will have a difficult time limiting their use of advanced 
technology in irregular warfare. Stephen Biddle also postulated that the “Expectations of 
a looming revolution in military affairs . . . could easily lead to an overemphasis on new 
technology . . . that could weaken, not strengthen, the American military.”11 Biddle 
stressed the importance of a strong technology strategy and that systematic materials 
interlace through military development; however, he only applied his theory to 
conventional, large-scale warfare. Without a clear technology strategy in irregular 
warfare, strong actors will continue to overemphasize the importance of high-tech, and 
operate without the capabilities obtainable with right-tech. 
Finally, according to John Arquilla, Friedrich August von der Heydte provided a 
more detailed difference between irregular and conventional warfare. Irregular warfare is 
a long, attritional conflict, whereas, the world wars aside, conventional conflicts are often 
short, with a single conclusive battle or campaign. Differing levels of technology are 
most effective in each type of conflict.12 The United States has long been adjusted to 
square off against other nation-states, and has maintained a conventional and 
technological strategy as a result. The war on terror, and its irregular environment, forced 
the United States to rethink each step of their strategy and operational technology use. 
With this new conflict, it is equally important not only for technology to be strategically 
interlaced among the military force in irregular warfare as it is in conventional warfare, 
                                                 
9 Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2010. 
10 Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918–
1988 (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1989), 7.  
11 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), ix.  
12 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped 
Our World (Lanham, MD: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), 9. 
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but it must also be properly matched to and applied in each warfare scenario. 
Unfortunately, the DOD leaderships’ continued tunnel vision focus on high-tech means 
over capability and effectiveness have failed to displace or defeat the irregular enemies 
within Afghanistan and Iraq. To make matters worse, those fighting against the United 
States have the opportunity to exploit these gaps in capability and effectiveness, giving 
them momentum and support for their cause. 
Despite this knowledge and counsel, the U.S. DOD has continued to court 
technology giants such as Boeing and Lockheed for newer, high-tech solutions. 
Operational commanders have joined academic scholars against this course of action. 
Captain Robert Newson, former Naval Special Warfare strategy and concept commander, 
argued against continued high-tech solutions for such a low-tech enemy. He suggests the 
cost will be too great for prolonged irregular warfare using expensive high-tech weapon 
systems, while our enemies continue to see success through low-tech means.13 Using this 
high-tech strategy against a low-tech enemy has proved to be a complete failure. High-
tech solutions have led to massive cost overruns and implementation delays, while 
ignoring the needs of the military forces brings the United States not a single step closer 
to ending the war on terror. These over-expenditures, multiplied over the course of a 
decade, have led to confined resource availability.14 Innovative use of lower technology 
offers a more proportional and cost-effective solution while maintaining an operational or 
asymmetric advantage.  
B. SHIFTING STRATEGY  
Following the attacks of September 2001, scholars studying irregular warfare 
advanced new theories on how developed nations—as the strong actors—should fight in 
irregular warfare. Many of these theories modify and update older ones, and they all 
attempt to outline the methods strong actors should follow to achieve success in irregular 
                                                 
13 Mark Pomerleau, “Special Forces: Why Use a Cadillac When a Ford Will Do,” Defense Systems 
Knowledge, 27 May 2015. (accessed 15 June, 2015), https://defensesystems.com/
articles/2015/05/27/ussocom-budget-pressures-isr.aspx. 
14 Amy Belasco, Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 
(CRS Report No. RL33110) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 2. 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 
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warfare. Some scholars suggest simple changes to the national strategy and operational 
planning; others modify combat techniques, and a rare few attempt to completely re-
structure the entire DOD.  
Andrew Mack argued that popular and political will influence the outcome of 
irregular wars, often giving the weaker actors victory. Because conventional campaigns 
are typically short-term conflicts decided by decisive battle, strong actors should not 
depend on continued, long-term popular and political support. In irregular warfare theory, 
weak actors may focus on drawing the conflict out over an extended period of time. As 
time progresses, strong actors suffer from falling popular support, which contributes to 
lost political resolve and forces the strong actor to abandon its engagement.15 Thus, weak 
actors need only strive to “hold out,” rather than achieve victory through a decisive 
engagement. The misapplication of technology strategy gives weak actors a further 
advantage in irregular warfare, and reduces the strong actors’ overall capability. 
Another irregular warfare theory advanced by Ivan Arreguín-Toft argues the weak 
win wars because of dissimilar strategies, noting that the weak actors’ commitment to the 
campaign nullifies the strong actors’ substantial power advantage.16 If a weak actor 
chooses an indirect method of conflict, the strong actor will stand the best chance of 
success by implementing a similar strategy, suggesting why the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) campaign has failed. Jeffrey Record noted that assistance, whether direct or 
indirect, from external actors influences the outcome for the weak actor. External actors 
may offer resources, technology, training, or political support in the international 
community, all of which influence the weak actors’ ability to wage irregular campaigns. 
However, this support would not enable the weak to fight conventionally, or in a direct 
manner.17 Mack, Arreguín-Toft, and Record ultimately conclude that the weak 
sometimes defeat the strong due to some degree of asymmetry induced by the strong 
                                                 
15 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 02 (1975): 175–200.  
16 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128.  
17 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters, Winter (2005): 16–31. 
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actors. Each argument focuses on removing the asymmetry, as a means to ensure 
continued resolve and support, enabling victory or enemy displacement.  
Using the logic outlined by Mack, Arreguín-Toft, and Record, strong actors 
should seek to remove asymmetries of effort that weak actors can exploit to enable 
success. If the weak actor can exploit the asymmetry technology creates, the increased 
capability or effectiveness obtained by this technology is removed, and there is increased 
cost with no benefit. Since the DOD has consistently focused solely on high-tech means 
as outlined in the national strategy, it failed to heed Gates’s recommendation of using 
technology that matches that of the enemy.18 By ignoring medium- and low-tech 
solutions and their potential for strategic integration, the United States has become part of 
the problem. The United States has created its own asymmetric “disadvantage” and thus 
given its opponents an unprecedented advantage in battle. This tunnel vision then 
impedes the success of an advanced military’s strategy and campaign against an enemy. 
Logic assumes that a strong actor looks for a power advantage over the weak; 
thus, this advantage would naturally become asymmetric. Strong actors such as the 
United States seek a power advantage over opponents through technological means. On 
the whole, advanced militaries believe they possess a higher capability and flexibility 
because of their technology, leading to a dangerous conclusion of instant superiority. This 
strategy, which emphasizes high-tech weaponry in irregular warfare, increases 
asymmetry between the strong and weak actors, but decreases both capability and 
effectiveness. This inverse results in a loss of a true technological advantage. The United 
States could utilize existing technology in an innovative manner if they: (1) reduced their 
dependency on high-tech; (2) sought to assimilate medium- and low-tech solutions into a 
thoughtful technology strategy; and (3) incorporated this strategy into a clear concise 
doctrine. These suggestions provide several advantages. Asymmetry of effort and cost are 
reduced, increased capability and effectiveness are achieved, and true asymmetry is 
attained by the strong actor. 
                                                 
18 Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2010), 2–9. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should strong actors with technologically advanced militaries use varying 
levels of technology to engage a weak actor in irregular warfare? And in turn, do strong 
actors efficiently use their technological advantages in a manner that leads to success in 
an irregular warfare campaign? This question is drawn from operational experience 
where technologically advanced militaries throw their technological advantages at a 
problem versus developing a strategy that efficiently employs the technological 
advantages.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To examine the use of technology in irregular warfare and understand the benefits 
offered by most levels of technology, it is important to define the different types of 
technology, review existing theories of technology in warfare, and develop case studies 
of technology-based environments in irregular warfare. Scholars and leaders, particularly 
over the past century, have been analyzing the evolution of technology to properly define 
its role and effectiveness in warfare. Additionally, some scholars believe environmental 
conditions of a given situation may lead to the misapplication of technology, and their 
analysis of the environment is based on simplicity and stability.19 By understanding the 
difference between a simple and complex environment—and a stable and unstable 
environment—it is possible to determine the correct level of technology that could enable 
success in irregular warfare. This would give the United States the ability to induce the 
desired asymmetry, and increase capability and effectiveness. 
1. Irregular Warfare and Technology 
The U.S. Air Force has recognized a problem with its employment of advanced 
technology, as they have noted in their irregular warfare doctrine that “[irregular warfare] 
is about right-tech, not about high or low-tech.”20 They have directed commanders to 
                                                 
19 These scholars include, but are not limited to, Biddle, Van Creveld, Boot, Rubright, and 
Wintringham all covered in the literature review.  
20 United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 3-2, Irregular Warfare. Washington DC: 
Department of the Air Force, March 15, 2013, 11. 
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look past high-tech for solutions at lower technological levels. However, the Air Force 
has not provided a method for its commanders to implement this guidance. This suggests 
the U.S. Air Force needs to develop a method for their commanders to properly use 
technology if the intent is for them to follow the doctrinal guidance of using right-tech. I 
would argue the DOD needs to address this strategic problem, not just the Air Force.  
Three noted scholars suggested doctrine must be addressed to enable the 
technology transformation called for by the OSD. According to Richard Rubright, 
“Doctrine applied by military force is as important as the military devices themselves.”21 
Moreover, Hone and Friedman postulate that any technology innovation is useless to the 
military components without a doctrine to exploit these advances or changes in 
technology. Additionally, this doctrine should be realized for building techniques and 
training to enhance technology employment capability and effectiveness.22 Although Air 
Force doctrine is the only one that addresses technology, its overly vague verbiage offers 
little assistance to commanders. Service doctrines must embrace a methodology to enable 
successful use of technology while increasing effectiveness and efficiency. This will 
prove to be problematic, as the DOD does not have a universally accepted definition of 
irregular warfare. 
  
                                                 
21 Richard W. Rubright, The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare 
(Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2014), 18.  
22 Thomas C. Hone and Norman Friedman, “Harnessing New Technologies,” in Transforming 
America’s Military, ed. Hans Binnendijk (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002), 31–36. 
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2. Defining Irregular Warfare 
Scholars have battled unsuccessfully for years to iron out a clear, yet all-inclusive 
definition of “irregular warfare.” Additionally, the DOD does not have a universally 
accepted definition of irregular warfare. The U.S. Army and Air Force have updated their 
definition of irregular warfare to reflect that of Joint Publication 1.23 The Navy, on the 
other hand, has yet to fully develop and publish their own definition of irregular warfare. 
If the Navy updated their doctrine to match that of the joint publication, this would be the 
first time all U.S. military branches unanimously shared the same definition, and may 
prevent the typical divergent reaction following a withdrawal from irregular warfare like 
that of the post-Vietnam era.24 Understanding how the military of a nation-state interprets 
irregular warfare is crucial to identifying and introducing the right technology into the 
conflict, and preventing unwanted asymmetry. For this analysis, irregular warfare (see 
Figure 1) is defined as actors using other than conventional warfare methods, including 
                                                 
23 United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 3-2, Irregular Warfare (Washington DC: 
Department of the Air Force, March 15, 2013); United States Army, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 
3-05, Special Operations (Washington DC: Department of the Army, August 31, 2012); Ronald O’Rourke, 
Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS 
Report No. RS22373) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/RS22373.pdf. 
24 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2009), 274–275. 
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low-intensity or periphery methods.25 This interpretation of irregular warfare is lower in 
intensity than conventional warfare, but may have elements of conventional warfare in it. 
Understanding what irregular warfare is enables the discussion of technology, and its 






                                                 
25 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 144–
146. Colin Gray implies irregular warfare encompasses a low-intensity conflict, which includes guerrilla 
and counter guerrilla warfare, or any operation that takes place in the periphery. Colin S. Gray, “Irregular 
Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters,” Strategic Studies, Winter (2007): 37. Gray updated his definition 
to include insurgency and terrorism; Hoffman, Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in 
Military Affairs, 396. Hoffman postulates that it is “nontraditional modes of warfare that are causing violent 
perturbations to the existing world order,” and it is becoming a new form of warfare altogether.; David 
Kilcullen, “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Face of Contemporary Conflict,” The Military Balance 105, 
no. 1 (2005): 412. David Kilcullen defines irregular warfare as “warfare involving non-state actors or non-
traditional methods”; Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (New York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1991), 299. Martin Van Creveld defines irregular warfare as “subconventional warfare 
. . . known as insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare”; Friedrich August von der Heydte and George 
Gregory, Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon (New York, NY: 
New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986), 3. Von der Heydte defines irregular warfare as “armed conflict, in 
which the parties are not large units, but small . . . in which the outcome is . . . achieved in a large number 
of small, individual operations”; United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special 
Operations. Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. July 16, 2014a, II-10. The United States 
Department of Defense has recently revised their doctrine to define irregular warfare (see figure II-1) as 
warfare that may include: Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Counterinsurgency (COIN); Counterterrorism 
(CT); Unconventional Warfare (UW); or Stability Operations. FID is defined as “US activities that support 
a Host Nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and program designed to protect against 
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability,” 
and UW as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Counterterrorism is defined as “activities and 
operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks in order to render them incapable of using 
unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals” and the 
“primary role in security operations is to support the reform, restructure, or reestablishment of the HN 
armed forces and the defense aspect of the security sector.” Finally, counterinsurgency is a “comprehensive 
civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root 
causes.” Figure II-1, Relationship between Special Operations and Irregular Warfare; United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, DC: 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. March 25, 2013, I-6. Irregular warfare is characterized as a violent 
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. 
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Figure 1.  DOD Interpretation of Irregular Warfare, What It Includes, and the 
Relationship with Special Operations. 
 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control of Air 
Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. February 10, 2014b, ll–2. 
3. Technology Theory 
Frank Hoffman points out how the misapplication of technology in irregular 
conflict can affect a strong actor’s chances of success, citing the war on terror as an 
example. Hoffman accurately identifies the United States’ need to evaluate the use of 
technology in irregular warfare. He highlights the need for technologically advanced 
militaries to change the ways they wage war, noting the future use of irregular tactics by 
weak actors will seek to avoid the overpowering conventional military supremacy like 
that of the United States. Hoffman argues the blending of warfare conducted by weak 
actors adds a new level of complexity, and strong actors have failed to select and apply 
the correct level of technology due to this complexity.26  
David Kilcullen asserts, “Armed forces today must deal with many adversaries 
beyond their traditional opponents, the regular armed forces of nation states . . . [t]his 
creates a multilateral and ambiguous environment, leading to vastly increased 
                                                 
26 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 8.  
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complexity.”27 Martin van Creveld argues, “The simpler the environment in which war is 
waged the greater the advantages offered by high technology.”28 He also notes the 
technology introduced by an external actor that is used by the weak actor must be simple 
due to environmental complexity.29 Thus, technology has the potential to affect all modes 
of warfare based on environmental complexity. Finally, according to Richard Rubright, 
“Integration of technology into a force structure can come at the cost of strategic thought 
and a tendency to ignore complex issues.”30 Technology, potentially, impacts the 
harmony between the different modes of warfare by steering strategy. In other words, 
strategy along with technology utilization shapes the environmental complexity, and if 
they are not in harmony with each other the technology capability may be reduced while 
increasing the environmental complexity. 
For strategists and commanders to employ technology effectively, they need to 
understand the environmental issues that these scholars have mentioned, and how a weak 
actor can take advantage of the environment and the perceived asymmetric advantage. 
Richard Daft explains that environmental complexity goes beyond the physical location; 
it is also the rate of change and the level of uncertainty in association with risk. Daft also 
suggests that many elements of the environment are uncontrollable; however, simplified 
structure and resource allocation can enable operating in a complex or unstable 
environment.31 According to Lawrence and Dyer, an organization needs to adapt to 
environmental complexity through the mechanisms that interact with the environment.32 
This suggests strong actors do not need to reorganize; rather, they need to change how 
they use their resources. 
                                                 
27 Kilcullen, Complex Irregular Warfare: The Face of Contemporary Conflict, 413.  
28 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (New York, NY: The Free 
Press, 1991), 272.  
29 Ibid., 300–310.  
30 Rubright, The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare, 17. 
31 Richard Daft, Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH: Cengage learning, 2012), 162–166.  
32 Paul R. Lawrence, Davis Dyer, and Tom Lupton, “Renewing American Industry,” R&D 
Management 18, no. 1 (1988): 45–54. 
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Van Creveld argues that conventional warfare takes place in a simpler, more 
stable environment than irregular warfare. His assertion about technology in warfare 
suggests the technologically advanced militaries need to consider the appropriate use of 
technology in irregular warfare, and the implications of its use from the political to the 
tactical based on environment. Tom Wintringham noted the ineffectiveness of technology 
when one’s enemy used guerrilla tactics during World War II. Strong actors at the time 
tried to apply the same technology to all modes of warfare. Wintringham points out its 
limitations, and suggests simpler machines might be more effective in this environment.33 
However, the United States and its allies seem to be embracing the same historical use of 
technology in the current war on terror, as if they are still fighting a conventional war. 
Following the logic outlined by Van Creveld and Wintringham, strong actors should 
reduce the level of technology employed in irregular warfare to match, or to slightly 
overmatch that of their enemies and limit the introduction of new technologies based on 
environmental complexity.  
On the other hand, Rubright argues combining all levels of existing technologies 
will enable the military to provide new capabilities.34 This would prevent the removal of 
the anticipated technological advantage a strong actor would expect. Thus, the best 
response should have the strong actor strategically apply all levels of technology where it 
can be most effective to increase the operational capability, and induce desired 
asymmetry while maintaining harmony of integration. However, he further argues new 
revolutionary technology is needed in irregular warfare to enable success.35 On the 
surface, it looks like Rubright contradicts himself with this assertion. The issue is how he 
defines technology level. He does not spend much time explaining his understanding of 
what is high-, medium-, and low-tech. For example, Rubright proposes that precision 
guided munitions (PMGs) and the Specter gunship are on the same technological level; 
however, under the definitions I have outlined in this analysis, PGMs are high-tech and 
                                                 
33 Tom Wintringham, The Story of Weapons and Tactics from Troy to Stalingrad (Boston MA: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), 207–230.  
34 Richard W. Rubright, The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare 
(Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2014), 139. 
35 Ibid., 139. 
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the AC-130H is medium-tech. Lastly, while he does argue technology upgrades are 
needed for irregular warfare, he continually stresses the need for harmony between 
technology integration and force development.36 
4. The Environment Matters 
It has been argued that navies, operating in open water, fight in a simple 
environment.37 However, strong navies, like that of the U.S., are using all levels of 
technology that have complicated the environment, potentially making the environment 
more complex and unstable. The German U-boats in World War II used a low-tech 
solution to develop snorkels, allowing them to stay submerged for long periods of time. 
The U-boats, assisted by the snorkels, complicated the environment for an open water 
navy, forcing navies to counter neatly masked subsurface threats as well as those 
traditionally silhouetted against the horizon on the surface. The revolutionary use of the 
snorkel resulted in an increased complexity of naval warfare.38 Additionally, it is clear 
that a navy operating at sea is no longer operating in a one-dimensional environment. 
Submarines and aircraft have changed the environment; it is more complex and unstable 
for a modern navy that needs to consider a three dimensional environment. This is a good 
example of technology affecting the environment. 
Van Creveld further argues the simplicity of the air environment.39 However, 
without all the details one does not fully understand the environment. What were the 
political implications of this incident? To the lay observer, the Doolittle raid was a simple 
brazen use of flying technology to strike at the heart of the Japanese identity of 
invincibility. However, the operating environment was complicated due to the way 
Doolittle’s unit used its available technology. The unit launched large heavy aircraft, 
traditionally land based, from an aircraft carrier designed for much smaller aircraft. Both 
the aircraft and aircraft carrier were nothing especially technological advanced given the 
                                                 
36 Rubright, The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency. 
37 Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present, 272–275.  
38 Eberhard Rössler, The U-Boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Inst Press, 1981).  
39 Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present, 272–275. 
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time, but the combination of the two technologies was revolutionary in nature to meet 
specific strategic and political benefits that far outweighed the immediate tactical success.40  
Finally, Wintringham notes the ineffectiveness of tank units as they faced 
guerrilla fighters in urban environments during World War II. He argues the asymmetry 
created by the guerrillas, and the complexity of using the tanks in this environment put 
unsupported tank units at a disadvantage. The tanks were more susceptible to anti-tank 
weapons, and did not have the fast repeatable weaponry like machineguns carried by 
infantry necessary to eliminate this elusive threat; additionally, Rubright suggests that 
“Attractive new technical systems run the risk of emphasizing what the system can do 
rather than emphasizing what their shortcomings are when used outside a very narrow 
niche.”41 The tank was very much a new technology and was revolutionary in nature. Its 
use changed the way warfare was waged however the tank did not fare well in this 
environment because the guerrilla actually had the asymmetric advantage. She could 
remain hard to see while delivering devastating short-range against tank units restricted to 
the urban caverns with little room to maneuver.42 This is a good example of how a 
technology-based asymmetry in military capabilities can be used by a weaker actor to 
exploit her capability gaps. 
In conclusion, technology is used extensively throughout warfare to create 
asymmetric advantage for one actor to impose his will over another. However, when 
technological advantages are employed in irregular warfare environments, multiple 
scholars have argued asymmetry potentially gives the weak actor the advantage over the 
strong actor in irregular warfare. Because the weak do not have the capability to face 
strong actors conventionally, they complicate the environment by operating when and 
where they choose, with weapons that attack weaknesses of the strong and in a manner 
that leaves them often invisible to a stronger actor.  
  
                                                 
40 Paolo E. Coletta, “Launching the Doolittle Raid on Japan, April 18, 1942,” Pacific Historical 
Review (1993), 73–86.  
41 Rubright, “The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 18. 
42 Wintringham, The Story of Weapons and Tactics from Troy to Stalingrad, 226–228. 
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II. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
Regardless of the country in question, militaries are generally organized, trained, 
and equipped to fight against like organizations in what is commonly described as 
conventional warfare. However, during irregular conflicts, where an opponent does not 
have the same capabilities, organized militaries do not adjust to their opponents and 
employ their technological advantages in a manner that would be best used against a 
different type of enemy. In particular during irregular conflicts, technologically advanced 
militaries actually perceive their advantage as a panacea to defeat what is already a 
technologically weaker opponent. In doing so, technologically advanced militaries create 
a disadvantage when they inappropriately apply technology without considering the 
enemy as an important factor as to what is best used. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
To test this claim, it should be apparent that if militaries during irregular warfare 
use their technological advantage appropriately then we should see a technological 
solution appropriately applied to a specific enemy-related tactical problem. For example, 
we should see aircraft designed for close air support being used in the role of close air 
support as opposed to a strategic bomber with advanced stealth capabilities being used 
inappropriately in the role of close air support directly impacting ground combat. This is 
not limited to the use of aircraft technologies. We should also see appropriate use of 
ground-tactical combat systems technologies. For example, the advances in artillery in 
the 20th century have been significant.43 If militaries are using their artillery systems 
appropriately, then we should see evidence of decisions being made to employ the correct 
type of artillery against targets that they can achieve the best effects. In irregular warfare, 
this may mean lighter artillery pieces that can move through canalized terrain or may 
                                                 
43 Dale Clarke, British Artillery 1914–19: Field Army Artillery, Vol. 94 (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 
2004). Andrew W. Hull, David R. Markov, and Steve Zaloga, Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design 
Practices: 1945 to Present (Detroit, MI: Darlington Productions, 1999). Federation of American Scientists, 
“FAS Military Analysis Network U.S. Land Warfare Systems,” (accessed Aug 13, 2015), 
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/. 
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require the ability to shoot at high angles in mountainous terrain in addition to being 
easily repaired in the field due to limited resupply and available maintenance. 
B. DEFINING THE LEVELS OF TECHNOLOGY 
Since different militaries have varying access to technology, each will have a 
different interpretation of what is the employment of high-tech and low-tech solutions to 
fight irregular opponents. Additionally, technology gradually permeates throughout all 
aspects of society, thus, the technological level is also dependent on the period examined. 
To bridge this gap, it is important to establish standard definitions. For this study, 
technology is divided into three categories: high, medium, and low.44 High-tech is 
considered cutting edge or revolutionary for its time and would be the most advanced 
technology available to a military organization. Low-tech is an established and 
understood capability that individuals can comprehend and generally employ with 
minimal technical assistance specific to a period of time. Medium-tech weapons’ systems 
                                                 
44 When exploring the possibility of integrating technology strategy into doctrine as suggested, one 
needs to understand the variations in technology. While examining the technology theories throughout the 
literature review, multiple scholars categorized technology as revolutionary, evolutionary, and proliferated 
respectively. 
Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present, 285–300. Evolutionary technology 
is characterized as a process of continual refinement through a series of incremental changes directed at 
improving capability or effectiveness. This is the majority of military technological history. Evolutionary 
technology is embedded in the organizational structure, from training to the battlefield, as the organization 
seeks to improve its technology effectiveness through efficiency. This evolution does not question the 
technologies ability to renders a decisive advantage. 
Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New 
York NY: Gotham Books, 2006) 6–8. When military technology transforms every aspect of warfare, then it 
is revolutionary in nature. This may occur from a single significant innovation in technology, or from 
multiple mutually supporting technology innovations. In other words, revolutionary technology has the 
potential to change every aspect of warfare, from the political to the tactical, and all the organizational 
structures that go with it. 
Keith L. Carter, “Technology Strategy Integration” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012). Proliferated technology is generally available to all actors; however, each actor may utilize the 
technology differently through innovation. Additionally, when resources are constrained, it may help to 
adopt a strategy to capitalize on the widespread proliferation of technology in general. 
The problem with these technology definitions within technology theory and the understanding of 
technology integration in irregular warfare is due to the drastic differences in technology use between 
strong and weak actor opponents. These definitions account for changes in time period and environments; 
however, they do account for the military’s, or guerrilla fighters that use them. Once a revolutionary 
technology exists, it is revolutionary for all actors regardless if they have access to it. The definitions I 
outlined allow the reader to see what high-tech through low-tech is for both actors simultaneously, and 
understand they may be different technologies for the same time period. 
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for this study are those technologies that skillfully blend available high and low 
technologies to deliver an effective capability. 
High-tech solutions are generally characterized as any new technologies that 
change, or revolutionize, warfare. Max Boot postulated that technology, “which spread[s] 
from one area to another, transform[s] everything.”45 Boot used PGMs as an example of 
revolutionary technology. PGMs are undeniably revolutionary high-tech weapons. 
Precision guided munitions may have revolutionized the way the United States military 
employed its assets both offensively and defensively. During World War II, the 
inaccuracy of strategic bombing munitions forced the Army Air Corps to allocate large 
amounts of resources to attack and eliminate individual targets. This resulted in higher 
costs throughout the supply and operational chains. The invention of technologies that 
could be used to employ PGMs, modern U.S. air power can now task single aircraft to 
destroy any given target. Though high-tech solutions provide an advantage in warfare; 
these technologies are often incredibly difficult to employ in irregular warfare due to 
complex engagement requirements that potentially degrade the capability since the 
weapons system cannot often be employed as intended. 
Low-tech solutions are readily available to all actors; yet, each actor may utilize 
the technology differently through innovation, based on location, supply chain 
availability, and mission effectiveness. Low-level technology solutions are extremely 
useful when resources are constrained as often the case with weak actors. As a 21st 
century example, prepaid tri-band cell phones are commonly used by insurgent groups 
today because of their ease of acquisition and now its common technologies. For an 
organization with limited infrastructure, the cell phone may be the primary means of 
communication as opposed to an actor with greater resources who may use the cell phone 
as a secondary or tertiary form of communication. 
Examples of medium-tech weapons systems include single platform examples 
such as the AC-130 gunship and tanks, which provide a blended solution between low- 
and high-level technologies. The AC-130 has evolved over time to meet the needs of the 
                                                 
45 Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today Penguin, 8.  
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changing battlefield and the answer the call for more effective and efficient use of this 
very limited resource. By utilizing high-tech sensors and low-tech guns, the AC-130 can 
provide a decisive advantage in a number of scenarios in a cost effective manner.46 The 
AC-130 model of blending technologies to meet a specific niche need is an exemplar of 
how technologies are continually refined to create a capability.  
As another example, the tank has evolved over the course of both world wars and 
most notably during the 45-year Cold War. Technological improvements provided 
several advantages. Advances in metallurgy led to the development of new high-tech 
alloys which in turn led to the employment of thinner, stronger, and lighter armor. All 
designed to improve survivability while not sacrificing maneuverability.47 The continual 
adaptation of high and low technologies together helps illustrate this middle category of 
weapons’ technologies used in this study. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study utilizes a heuristic approach to address the role of technology during 
irregular warfare. This qualitative approach illuminates possible technology integration 
strategies in irregular warfare through historical cases. This research focuses on 
identifying the proper use of technology in irregular warfare by examining the impacts of 
doctrine and on-the-ground decisions related to the use of technology. Accompanying the 
case study approach, an in-depth technical examination of artillery and aircraft utilized 
during each conflict studied offers insights into how technology influenced the decision 
to employ certain equipment over others to counter irregular opponents.  
In order to examine the effectiveness of technology in operations to counter 
irregular opponents, this study compares three different conflicts in Afghanistan since 
1919. Each case illustrates a different prominent actor’s use of technology to fight an 
                                                 
46 William P. Head, Night Hunters: The AC-130s and Their Role in U.S. Airpower (College Station, 
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014). Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the 
Present.  
47 Bo Carlsson, "The evolution of manufacturing technology and its impact on industrial structure: an 
international study," Small Business Economics 1, no. 1 (1989), 21-37. Seth W. Carus, "Military 
technology and the arms trade: changes and their impact." Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (1994), 163-174. 
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asymmetrically disadvantaged Afghan opponent. The first case is the Third Anglo-
Afghan War (1919) fought between the British and the Afghans. The second is the Soviet 
occupation and fight against Afghan Mujahedeen (1979-1989). The final case is the 
United States-led campaign in Afghanistan (2001-2014).  
By keeping the terrain of Afghanistan and a common enemy (the Afghan 
mujahedin fighter) as constants across all three cases, the research design allows three 
different actors to generally employ their respective military technologies and doctrine 
under the same circumstances. The differences across the actors then helps illuminate 
how very different actors make similar decisions in regards to employing types of 
military technology under like circumstances. 
This design affords for variation across three different actors as well as 
technology across three different time periods. All three strong actors were 
technologically advanced for their period and were similarly organized military forces; 
yet, each actor has a distinct military doctrine of its own. First, the British doctrine is 
based on their World War I experience fighting trench warfare, and as such their tactics 
and use of technology represent this even though the British had vast experience 
conducting colonial warfare. Second, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan mirrors their 
formations and preparations for fighting in the plains of Western Europe. The Soviets 
chose to use a plethora of armored vehicles, artillery support groups, and a variety of 
supporting aircraft that are more suitable against NATO’s mechanized formations. 
Finally, the United States, though it started the war with an unconventional invasion 
using small special operations forces teams and Afghan mujahedin counterparts as part of 
the Northern alliance, the conflict quickly became dominated by U.S. conventional forces 
with larger bases, armored vehicles albeit small ones, and supporting artillery typically 
limited to base use and base defense. Simply put, each military examined was designed to 
fight militaries similar to itself and not a guerrilla force. 
1. Mission Type 
A successful military campaign requires senior leaders and strategists to examine 
current doctrine, mission priorities, and available assets with their associated capabilities 
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in order to formulate a comprehensive campaign strategy based on mission type. 
According to recent U.S. Army doctrine combat systems and support of ground 
operations support three general types of operations: offensive, defensive, and shaping.48 
These three types of operations then lead to specific methods of employment of each 
combat system. The focus in this study is not so much the types of the operations, but 
more importantly, how the combat system is employed within each type of operation 
against an irregular enemy such as the Afghan mujahedin.  
Shaping operations encompass all operations that set the stage for the campaign. 
Examples include reconnaissance, massing troops and equipment, preemptive air strikes, 
and artillery bombardment. Defensive operations have a twofold purpose: to defend 
captured territory against enemy attacks through economy of force, and to provide a 
stronghold for use as a base of operations in the field. Offensive operations are intended 
to defeat the enemy through the use of resources available to leaders. Each of these 
missions works in conjunction with the others.49 The distinctions between these three 
types of operations are important because the specific effect needed in support of these 
operations determines the manner in which combat systems are employed. For example 
artillery fire in support of defensive or shaping operations do not need to be as accurate as 
artillery fire in support of offense of operations. This is mainly because in offensive 
operations it is assumed friendly ground forces will be advancing on the enemy. Under 
defensive or shaping scenarios generally we expect fire to be concentrated on enemy 
formations approaching friendly ground forces 
2. Mission Flexibility, Environment, and Required Support 
This research looks at factors focused on technology and its effectiveness, 
building an analytical framework based on the mission types outlined above while 
                                                 
48 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States. (Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), I-7. United States Army, 
Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington DC: Department of the 
Army, May 16, 2012). ADRP 3-0 offers a broader understanding of these three types of operation, and the 
Joint Pub links them to IW. 
49 United States Army, Army Special Operations Forces (FM 3-05) (Washington DC: Department of 
the Army, 2014a), 1–3.  
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considering three variables for technology strategy in irregular warfare. These variables 
include: mission flexibility, the operational environment, and the required system 
maintenance or support. First, examining the combat system flexibility, or multi-purpose 
capability of a technology utilized will highlight the adaptability and innovation afforded 
to the operators in this type of dynamic warfare. Second, the operational environment 
will determine some of the required technological capabilities, and examining the 
technology utilized based on this variable will illustrate operational limitations. Finally, 
irregular warfare is generally a limited war; thus, the support for employed combat 
systems may also be limited. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The study proceeds accordingly. Chapters III, IV and V are each an in-depth case 
studies that examine how a prominent military power has employed technology against a 
technologically disadvantaged opponent. Each case study briefly reviews the historical, 
doctrinal, and political origins of each conflict. As Rubright states “[t]he military 
capability directly dictate the military options available to policy makers”; thus, this 
influences technology strategy through political narrative and doctrinal changes.50 
Furthermore, each case analyzes the technology and strategy employed during each 
conflict with special emphasis given to a review of the use of key military capabilities, 
their e effectiveness when compared to other combat systems available. Chapter VI 
presents a summation of findings, as well as recommendations for engaging in further 
irregular conflicts. The two appendices cover all the technical information for each case 
study. Appendix A covers: modern doctrine and mission responsibility for artillery, 
illustrates the commanders decision matrix, provides an in-depth technical examination 
based on capabilities, and explains the findings for each case study. Appendix B covers 
the same information, only focused on aircraft. 
                                                 
50 Rubright, The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare, 17. 
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III. IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN 
THE THIRD BRITISH ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 
The British Empire went to war with Afghanistan three different times prior to 
World War II; however, the Third Anglo-Afghan war, in 1919, was the only one of the 
three to include airpower and a modern mechanized ground force developed for large 
conventional warfare. The British military doctrine, technology employment, and general 
operating structure were heavily influenced by World War I, changing their method of 
warfare all together from previous irregular conflicts that were the hallmark of the British 
Empires “small wars” of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the surface, the Third Anglo-
Afghan War appeared to be a conventional state versus state conflict; however, the 
strength of the Afghan people comes from tribal guerrilla fighters, and not a state-
sponsored military. The British government was well aware of the guerrilla threat in 
Afghanistan; yet, chose to fight this war in a conventional manner.51 This would prove 
costly as the British Indian military would be challenged beyond their capability when 
facing the Afghan guerrilla fighters compared to their actions against conventionally 
arrayed Afghan military units. 
A. END OF THE SECOND ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 
In 1880, the treaty ending the Second Anglo-Afghan War led to Afghan 
dependency on the British Empire, and the British mostly conducted all their activity with 
Afghanistan through their Indian colony. This treaty established a British political office 
in Kabul, and dictated that the Afghan government would turn to British India for all 
foreign policy activity and intra-government tutelage. Over the next forty years, the 
relationship between Afghanistan and Britain remained fairly stable; however, this 
relationship fractured during World War I. Afghanistan remained neutral in World War I. 
Though Afghanistan did not fight when the Ottoman Empire called for a Jihad against its 
enemies, they also refused to help Britain against the Ottomans.52 This led to much unrest 
                                                 
51 Edgar O’Ballance, Afghan Wars 1839–1992: What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost 
(Herndon, VA: Brassey, 1993). 
52 Ibid., 50–51.  
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in Afghanistan as a predominantly Muslim tribal based society. Prior to World War I, 
tribal leaders did not push back against the central government with regard to British 
influence; however, their faith required them to answer the call for Jihad from the 
Ottoman Empire. When the Shah elected to ignore the call for Jihad, the tribal leaders 
within Afghanistan became enraged as this was against their faith. The tribal leaders 
carried more influence with the local tribes than the Shah, and when the British tried to 
reestablish their control in the region following World War I these tribal leaders 
demanded action toward independence. 
In 1919, the Shah attempted to gain international recognition by seeking a seat at 
the Versailles Peace Conference. The Shah’s request was denied, and shortly after, the 
population of Afghanistan continued to demand independence. When Shah Habibullah 
did not seek additional measures to push out British influence, he was assassinated. The 
new Shah, Amanulla Khan, called for quick action and demanded Afghanistan’s 
independence. Amanulla Khan knew that this would ensure the people of Afghanistan 
would support his claim as the rightful successor of Habibullah. Additionally, Amanulla 
Khan gave the military members of Afghanistan a significant raise, ensuring their loyalty. 
With the military’s support, the new Shah was able to arrest multiple individuals who 
were seen to threaten his claim as the rightful successor. With his throne secured, 
Amanulla Khan sent a letter to the British Empire in early March 1919, and for the first 
time spoke of an independent Afghanistan.53 
B. GOING TO WAR 
In early April 1919, Shah Amanulla Khan gave a speech to the people of 
Afghanistan that clearly reinforced his desires for an independent Afghanistan. 
According to one British agent, the speech went as follows: 
I have declared myself and my country entirely free, autonomous and independent 
both internally and externally. My country will hereafter be as independent a state 
as the other states and powers of the world are. No foreign power will be allowed 
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to have a hairsbreadth of right to interfere internally and externally with the 
affairs of Afghanistan.54 
Another British agent, Lord Chelmsford, felt that the new Shah should be able to 
renegotiate to some degree, as this had been done in the past; however, Lord Chelmsford 
chose to largely ignore the Shah’s request. It became clear that Britain was tired of war as 
the country continued to seek political resolve, but continually fails to grant the 
independence Amanulla Khan demanded. To their dismay, the Shah continued to press 
the issue, and in early May he called for military action. 
The political reaction from British India, following the arrival of Afghan military 
troops on its western border, was still lackadaisical, with no military action or 
mobilization. Three potential reasons existed for this lack of response: the British people 
were tired of war, they had exhausted their resources, or they were preoccupied with 
other issues such as an uprising in British India. All three reasons have been suggested as 
overarching evidence to why the British did not react militarily to the new Shah’s actions; 
unfortunately, before mid-May these countries would be at war.55 The British military of 
1919 existed in a society that was largely anti-war, and military leaders found themselves 
operating in a resource-deprived environment.56 The political and military interaction for 
the British Empire was divided, where the Afghan populace and military was clearly 
supporting their political leaders. Additionally, the British military forces in India, 
compared to British India pre-World War I, were much less prepared for war due to troop 
and the supply depletion it caused. Prior to World War I, the British Indian military had 
over 60 regiments, but following the war it had only ten; additionally, as Shah Khan 
threatened war, the British military was going through a mass demobilization.57 In 
summary, the people in Britain did not have the will for another war, much less a long 
protracted war in Afghanistan; however, their military forces were still far superior to that 
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of the Afghan military, and this leads the British to expect a quick victory. As the war 
unfolded over the next four months, this proved to be a false assumption. 
C. DOCTRINE LIMITING RIGHT-TECH 
Changes to doctrine often come from innovation, revolution, or evolution. While 
this change may help in current conflicts, it also hampers future innovation and 
operations for both British artillery and aviation. The British artillery and aviation 
communities were greatly affected by World War I. Prior to that war, British artillery was 
split among three different organizations of the Royal Army: the Royal Horse Artillery 
(RHA), the Royal Field Artillery (RFA), and the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) of 
which , the RHA was the dominant organization. The mechanization and employment 
methods developed during World War I led the RFA to became the dominant 
organization during World War I, and changed the missions for all three thereafter.58 As 
a technology with only a handful of years of combat service, aviation also struggled to 
find an effective mission because of indecisive air operations in World War I. This would 
be seen in the mountains of Afghanistan as employment methods did not initially prove 
very useful for either the artillery or aviation. 
1. Artillery Doctrine 
Following World War I, artillery employment doctrine was very different for each 
artillery organization. Prior to World War I, RFA was primarily employed during shaping 
and offensive operations. RHA organizations employed light, highly mobile artillery 
pieces, but were generally low caliber weapons to achieve the needed mobility orienting 
them toward offensive operations. RGA organizations utilized heavy, large caliber, long-
range artillery designed for defensive operations. Doctrinally, the RFA was employed 
with the infantry units, as their artillery pieces would setup far behind advancing infantry 
and send rounds over friendly troops attacking enemy troops through indirect fire. RGA 
organizations were designed to protect a fort, a coastal city, or a sea port, and their 
artillery was permanent to its location due to its heavy weight. Finally, the RHA 
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organizations were designed to provide flexibility of direct or indirect fire, mobility, and 
quick employment.  
At the beginning of World War I, all artillery organizations consisted mainly of 
seasoned, career oriented troops; however, World War I depleted these well trained, 
seasoned solders. By early 1915, the British were suffering from a lack of RFA artillery 
trained personnel; thus, the RHA was re-missioned to support field artillery.59 Before the 
end of 1915, the RHA was firmly part of the RFA, while on paper they were still a 
separate organization to support infantry. Additionally, the large heavy, long-range 
artillery pieces associated with the RGA were starting to become mobile through 
mechanization. These heavy pieces were far too large for horse or pack movement, but 
tractors and tracked vehicles could move them with ease. By the middle of World War I, 
RGA, RFA, and RHA were organized to work in unison far behind infantry units trying 
to advance forward.60 By the end of World War I, all three artillery organizations were 
accustomed to working with each other with integrated fires based on maps and surveys. 
By 1918, the doctrine governing artillery operations had shifted to support this type of 
artillery interaction.61 However, not all lessons of conventional warfare easily transfer to 
irregular warfare, and the British did not have doctrine to address irregular warfare. 
2. Aviation Doctrine 
The Royal Air Force (RAF) was established in 1918, combining the Army and 
Navy aviation components into a single air force. There were several problems that 
developed from the combination of these assets into a new service. The Royal Army 
(RA) believed that the primary mission for aircraft should be close air support for ground 
forces, and the Royal Navy felt the mission should be strategic bombing. Additionally, 
the RAF did not publish any service doctrine until 1922; however, other internal 
documents suggest strategic bombing was the RAF’s main focus following the end of 
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World War I.62 With no formal doctrine to guide the RAF, and operating in a time of 
limited resources, their success required finding a mission that limited cost and risk to 
personnel. This led the leadership of the RAF to consider all probable options in the 
Third Anglo-Afghan war. 
Air Publication (AP) 1300 was the first RAF doctrine published in 1922. There 
was considerable overlap in this doctrine and the doctrine used by both the Royal Flying 
Corp (RFC) and the Royal Navy prior to the formation of the RAF. The first six chapters 
were adapted from the RFC, chapter eight was adapted from the Navy, and chapter 
eleven was adapted from a joint operations manual. Chapter seven was forged from the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War, and shaped the success of the RAF during the interwar period. 
This chapter highlights the need for air superiority, the need for reconnaissance in 
conjunction with bombing runs for after action assessment, and the need to respond 
offensively and defensively both in combat and non-combat operations. This doctrine 
enabled the RAF to deal with guerilla activity, as well as conduct political, conventional 
and unconventional military operations. More specifically, this chapter defined the RAFs 
idea of strategic bombing, both offensively and defensively.63 This publication shaped 
the RAF around policing activities, and enabled much of their success throughout the 
interwar period. 
D. TECHNOLOGY USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD  
The Afghan Army deployed with a variety of rifles and artillery. According to 
General Molesworth, the Afghan army had modern German, Turkish and British rifles; 
however, the bulk of their force carried Martinis and Snyders, 19th century, obsolete 
relics of the British Empire. Though, the Afghan army did have a few four-barrel 
Gardiner machine guns. Artillery pieces consisted of modern Krupp howitzers and Krupp 
mountain guns; however, the bulk of the Afghan artillery pieces were obsolete as the 
preponderance of artillery used was black powder bursting charges. 
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The Afghan army was not mechanized so the logistical movement of these heavy 
artillery pieces was through horse or pack.64 The Snyders and Martinis were the only 
rifles that had proliferated through the Afghan military and much of their ammunition 
was in poor condition due to age and poor storage practices. While the Afghan military 
appears as an ill-equipped conventional actor, the true strength of the Afghan military 
was in its tribal fighters.65 The tribal fighters were generally better equipped and trained 
than the Afghan Army. Additionally, the tribal fighters outnumbered the Afghan military, 
and did not have the extensive logistical requirements as the army did. Additionally, the 
guerrillas lived and fought in the same area giving them an advantage in understanding of 
the environment and the ability to slip back into the population to avoid being decisively 
engaged with larger enemy forces.  
While the British military in the Indian colonies was much smaller in numbers 
than prior to World War I, its weapons’ technology integration was vastly superior to the 
Afghans. Artillery included Quick Fire (QF) 13-pounder, QF 18-pounder, and Breech 
Loading (BL) 60-pounder guns. Additionally, the British had an array of 3.7 inch, 4.5 
inch, and 6 inch howitzers.66 Much of the older low-tech gun artillery was drawn by 
horse, where some of the newer high-tech Howitzer artillery was pulled by tractor. With 
the exception of the cavalry units, the logistical lines were predominantly motorized for 
the British military; however, this proved to be problematic in the underdeveloped 
mountains of Afghanistan. The rolling chassis of the artillery and their tow-vehicles 
could not traverse much of the terrain, and ammo re-supply units had to trans-load 
resupplies from transport vehicle to horse drawn wagons to resupply units far removed 
from anything that resembled a road.  
Finally, British aircraft the included the Bristol F2 fighter, the Royal Aircraft 
Factory B.E.2c, the Handley Page machine, the Airco D.H.9A, and the Airco D.H.10.67 
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The B.E.2c, the Handley Page machine, and the Bristol fighter were both pre-World War 
I aircraft. Additionally, both the D.H. aircraft entered service just prior to the end of 
World War I. 
1. Artillery Technology 
The artillery during this time period was categorized as light, medium, and heavy 
artillery. Light artillery tended to be more mobile with smaller caliber shells and shorter 
ranges. Additionally, British tactics employed used a variety of artillery types operating 
in unison, taking advantage of the increased range offered by heavy artillery to prevent 
replacement troops from reaching the front lines in a conventional war. As technology 
changed, the light artillery improved in accuracy, reduced weight making it more mobile, 
and increased the rate of fire. On the other hand, heavy artillery tended to get heavier, 
with larger heavier rounds, and a slower rate of fire. Mechanization enabled this change 
in heavy artillery, where before artillery units were limited to the weight a team of horses 
could pull.68 For this time period, mechanization directly influences what may be high-
tech. Some artillery may be considered low- or medium-tech when not mechanized, but 
high-tech when dependent on mechanization. Below is a comprehensive overview of 
each piece of artillery, for a complete capabilities review (see Table 1 in Appendix A). 
The QF 13-pounder and 18-pounder guns were the oldest pieces of artillery used 
in this war, and were quickly followed by the BL 60-pounder gun. The QF 13-pounder 
and QF 18-pounder guns were nearly identical, and utilized some of the same 
ammunition components. The main difference was the carriage these guns were carried 
on. The QF 13-pounder gun was designed to be lighter to make it more maneuverable in 
the field; however, the lighter carriage made the gun less accurate, with a slower rate of 
fire compared to the QF 18-pounder gun. Both guns had a fixed type artillery round much 
like a modern bullet, where the round and propellant were cased in brass. This enabled a 
20 round per minute rate of fire for the QF 18-pounder gun, and a slightly slower rate for 
the QF 13-pounder gun due to the weight issues previously discussed.69 Additionally, the 
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light weight of the QF 13-pounder gun prohibited the use of ammunition with a high 
propellant charge; it would damage the carriage from excessive recoil. Thus, the QF 13-
pounder gun only had two types of ammunition, and the QF 18-pounder gun had eight 
types of ammunition. Both these guns are low-tech artillery pieces that benefit from 
interchangeable parts and operating crews.  
The QF 4.5 inch and 3.7 inch howitzers were rated as medium-level artillery by 
the British, not to be confused with medium-tech. While these howitzers are labeled as 
quick fire artillery, they were much slower than the QF 13-pounder and QF 18-pounder 
guns listed above. The howitzers had separate type ammunition where the round and 
propellant were loaded separately with no brass casing. This slowed the rate of fire to six 
rounds per minute; however, the propellant could be adjusted based on range 
requirements increasing its overall flexibility in combat.70 The 4.5 inch howitzer is 
clearly medium-tech for this conflict, as it is still horse drawn, relatively light and mobile 
with improved accuracy and range. The 3.7 inch howitzer appears to be more advanced 
as it was still experimental at the time of this conflict; however, it utilized low-tech 
rounds and mobility with an experimental high-tech field assembly process.71 Therefore, 
the 3.7 inch howitzer is also medium-tech.  
While the BL 60 is an older piece of artillery, it was modified during World War 
I. These modifications made the artillery too heavy for horse drawn units; thus, it was 
adapted to tractor tow units, and limited its mobility.72 Additionally, these modifications 
did increase the effective range and accuracy, but it still suffered from a slow rate of fire. 
The required mechanization to support this artillery piece makes it high-tech, where the 
lighter horse drawn version would have been low-tech. The BL 6 inch howitzer was 
developed in 1915, and was relatively light for a heavy artillery piece; however, it was 
mounted on a pull trailer needed for World War I making it better suited for urban versus 
rural terrain. Additionally, the ammo for this unit was more advanced enabling a short or 
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long range option without adjusting the gun setup.73 The BL 6 inch howitzer was towed 
by tractor during this conflict, suggesting it was an advanced model; thus, is considered 
high-tech. 
2. Aircraft Technology 
The aircraft during this time period were referred to as fighters, bombers, or 
reconnaissance aircraft; yet, they were not locked into these missions. It is helpful to 
examine the overall capability of each aircraft. Fighter aircraft tended to be smaller and 
faster, but generally had a shorter range of operation. Bomber aircraft tended to be the 
largest aircraft, needing the most support, but they generally had a high payload, longer 
range of operations at higher altitudes. Additionally, the tactics implemented by the 
British would have these bombers acting as reconnaissance aircraft as well to evaluate 
bombing effectiveness. Reconnaissance aircraft tended to be the middle ground with 
regard to size and needed support. They also tended to have more aircrew members that 
proved to enable more flexibility. Additionally, aircraft started to fly higher as the power 
output of their engines were improved. Below is a comprehensive overview of each 
aircraft. For a complete capabilities review (see Table 1 in Appendix B). 
The first aircraft used in the Third Anglo-Afghan War was the Royal Aircraft 
Factory B.E.2c as part of an offensive operation to recapture lost territory.74 Why was 
this aircraft chosen over more advanced aircraft that may have been available? RAF 
Squadron 99 was in British India with D.H.9a aircraft that were not utilized till later in 
the war.75 Both of these aircraft were developed for the same mission, reconnaissance 
and bombing, but the D.H.9a could carry more bombs and fuel.76 Additionally, the 
B.E.2c aircraft was obsolete by this time, and was retired following this conflict. Their 
involvement may have been related to the force that was in place at the time, a very 
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junior inexperienced force. On the other hand, this aircraft was one of the first to be put 
into service as it entered service in 1912; thus, this technology integration within the 
force was very high. Finally, this aircraft was used as the primary trainer aircraft for the 
RAF, and nearly all the pilots had been qualified on it as part of their training, and pilots 
available at the time may have limited the aircraft choice.77 
At the other end of the technological spectrum, the D.H.9a and D.H.10 aircraft 
used by the British were the most advanced in that series. The D.H.9a is an updated 
D.H.4, and the D.H.10 is an updated D.H.3. The D.H.9a engine has nearly double the 
horse power, fuel capacity, and payload capability of the D.H.4; however, it was slower 
at altitude and throughout the climb. The D.H.10 is an updated D.H.3, both were twin 
engine designs, and faster with higher payloads than the D.H.4 or D.H.9a. Again, the 
D.H.10 has more horse power, fuel capacity, and payload capability; yet, slower at 
altitude and in the climb.78 Finally, the D.H.10 was not the only twin engine aircraft 
available, and was largely untested. 
The Bristol Fighter and the Handley Page machine are good examples of medium-
tech aircraft of the time. The Bristol F.2 Fighter entered service in 1916. This was two 
years prior to the D.H.9a’s first flight, and four years after the B.E.2c. The Bristol Fighter 
was faster than all these aircraft, at altitude and in the climb; however, the fuel capacity 
was less than that of the D.H.9a, and more than the B.E.2c. The Bristol fighter offered 
better protection from ground fire, as it had metal plating around the engine and under the 
aircrew. Finally, the Bristol Fighter had a lower payload capacity compared to the 
D.H.9a, and higher capacity compared to the B.E.2c.79 The Handley Page machine 
entered service in 1916, the same year as the D.H.3; however, it proved more capable in 
most ways, and the D.H.3 was retired in 1917. Based on that information, the Handley 
Page machine was the oldest twin engine bomber in service during the 1919, Third 
Anglo-Afghan War, and may be considered low-tech. How does the Handley Page 
machine compare to the D.H.10?  
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The Handley Page machine V1500, used in the bombing of Kabul, held nearly 
800 gallons more fuel, and had more powerful engines than the D.H.10. The Handley 
Page machine 0400 held nearly 100 gallons more fuel than the D.H.10 as well, giving 
both variants more flight time than the D.H.10; however, it was considerably slower than 
the D.H.10, and was much heavier.80 Additionally, one could argue the D.H.10 would 
operate more efficiently at these lower weights, and this may negate the smaller fuel load 
capacity. All the aircraft operated at speeds between 70 and 130 MPH, all were propeller 
engines, and all could land or takeoff nearly anywhere. Examining the use of these 
technologies will highlight how the British managed a right-tech solution. 
3. Military Operational Integration 
The British Indian military took 62 pieces of artillery into the Khyber Pass, where 
the first combat operations took place; however, only 54 were operational during combat. 
The Peshawar area had 14 pieces in operation, and the Khaibar area had the remaining 40 
pieces of artillery.81 It has been suggest the remaining artillery was left near a fort at the 
mouth of the pass.82 The British moved into the area of combat operation the day prior in 
a large heavy motorcade, a technique developed in World War I. This technique was 
abandoned the first day of combat due to terrain in the area.83 On 6 May, 1919, the 
British units opened fire and were quick to push the Afghan military out of British India, 
and neutralize there artillery. However, tribal guerrilla reinforcements on the northern 
flank stopped the British advance, short of entering Afghanistan. The B.E.2c flew the 
first air mission in this war in support of British ground troops pinned down. This was a 
reactionary mission launched to support ground personnel after a perceived Afghan 
invasion into the British Indian colony. These aircraft performed light bombing within 
built up areas, and machine gun fire strafing runs for guerrilla fighters in the open.  
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The guerrilla fighters had positioned themselves on the upper mountain 
ridgelines, and effectively neutralized the British artillery that was so effective on the 
open flat plain just days prior.84 The maps the British artillery units had available for 
these indirect fire missions were inaccurate, not accounting for needed elevation changes. 
Additionally, the B.E.2c was so slow in the climb up to altitude; they would fly through 
the valley of the pass putting the guerrilla fighters above them. This was a position the 
B.E.2c could not defend against. As a result, the RAF utilized the Bristol Fighter, with a 
much faster rate of climb, to get above the ridge line and force the guerrilla fighters off 
the ridges.85 The ground force commander felt these aircraft were so effective against the 
scattered enemy fighters that additional air support was requested and received 
throughout the remaining northern engagements.86 Additionally, the Artillery units were 
able to assemble the 3.7 howitzers along the steep mountain areas where other artillery 
could not be utilized. This prevented the maneuvering guerrilla forces from advancing on 
their position as aircraft continued aerial bombardment. Finally, the RHA quickly 
abandon procedures developed for modern conventional warfare, and innovation enabled 
the QF 18-pounder guns to become very effective at direct fire terrain denial. 
Initially, the RHA units had their artillery setup along with the RFA in a line 
behind the infantry; however, this left the cavalry exposed to guerrilla fighters 
maneuvering in the high ground. The RHA abandoned this after the infantry was pinned 
down on the first day, and started riding forward with the main cavalry units. When the 
cavalry approached guerrilla fighters, the RHA was able to setup the 18-pounder guns in 
less than a minute. Couple that with the 20 rounds per minute and four guns per cavalry 
unit, they quickly denied terrain to enemy fighters forced to move due to the air 
bombardment. Once enemy fighters were pinned down by the 18-pounder guns, the 
Bristol Fighters and B.E.2c aircraft could target them very effectively. As communication 
procedures with aircraft and the ground force became standardized, the artillery 
discovered these aircraft could request artillery, and quickly get them on target. Aircrew 
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would call for fire, and observe the fall of the rounds. This was relayed via one way 
radio, and the assigned battery would adjust as requested and continue firing. When the 
artillery unit was accurately on target, the aircrew would say fire for effect and the battery 
would open fire with all its guns.87 This innovation quickly enabled artillery units to 
accurately utilize indirect fire without accurate maps and survey data.  
The British pushed the Afghan military back closer to the border, and the guerrilla 
fighters seemed to just disappear. As the British forces pushed further west, the short 
flight duration became problematic as the ground force was getting further from 
operating airfields. Additionally, ammunition was in short supply for the 3.7 howitzers. 
There was also a fear of a large guerrilla force counterattack along this northern pass into 
Afghanistan.88 Thus, following the success of the British military around Dakka, Royal 
Army leaders chose to stay within the British Indian colony and not to pursue ground 
operations within Afghanistan. However, the RAF was able to go on the offensive. 
Within Afghanistan, having complete air superiority, the RAF pursued bombing 
operations in Jalalabad and Kabul.89 On 24 May, 1919, the Handley Page V1500 aircraft 
bombed Kabul, Afghanistan. This was a 3-hour one-way flight for this aircraft, which 
puts the mission duration around 6.5 hours. This extended mission duration eliminated all 
other aircraft, available to British India, from performing this mission.90 Bomb payload 
may have also been a factor, as there were multiple targets within Kabul. This attack led 
to the evacuation of over half the city’s inhabitants, and is believed to be a main factor 
that led the Afghan government to seek peace.91 Take note that the oldest bomber in the 
RAF was the only aircraft with this long strike capability, and keep in mind it was also a 
niche mission with this aircraft doing what it was designed for. This conventional 
offensive attack led to an expected reaction from the Afghan government, and is a clear 
example of a right-tech solution for the tactics being employed. 
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While the British Indian Army found success in one location, the Afghan Army 
pushed forward in others. This led to continued operations within the British colony’s 
western front against guerrilla fighters, and conventional Afghan military units. The 
Bristol fighter and D.H.9a were the primary aircraft operating during this time, and may 
have been due to reliability issues listed below. These aircraft were dropping bombs on 
embedded enemy fighters, and conducting strafing runs when they were out in the open. 
The success of the D.H.9a in this role led to it being re-missioned following the 
conclusion of this war. The D.H.9a was re-missioned for policing activity throughout the 
Middle East, used by the British and the Afghan government in this role.92 This became 
the primary mission for the RAF during the intra war period as well, and is seen in their 
doctrine. Unfortunately, as the war continued, and the British found themselves pushed 
back by Afghan forces from Khost. 
Just as things stabilized around Dakka, Afghan military units, reinforced with 
tribal fighters, pushed into the Waziristan area to the south. British forces were forced to 
withdraw from this area before the end of May, and the British within the four 
surrounding areas were now being threatened. However, following the success found by 
the British in Dakka, plus the bombing runs over Jalalabad and Kabul, peace talks were 
underway. The British leaders did not want to risk more tribal fighters uprising at this 
stage of the war; thus, they used aircraft to drop leaflets informing tribesman of the talks 
to prevent any further unrest. Finally, there were rumors of Soviet aircraft arriving in 
Afghanistan to strengthen the Afghan garrison forces.93 While the Afghan government 
was able to strengthen its position, the British were having problems with resupply lines.  
Aircraft parts and artillery ammunition were beginning to affect combat 
operations for the British units. For aircraft operations, the main problem had to do with 
landing gear issues, from tires to struts. The aircraft with higher reliability rates, or low 
maintenance costs, were heavily utilized due to this resupply issue. At one point there 
was only one mission capable D.H.10, four D.H.9a’s, and seven Bristol Fighters.94 Thus, 
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the DH9a and Bristol Fighters saw the most use in theater from June to August. As for 
the ammunition issue, the 3.7 inch howitzer had the least available starting the campaign, 
and quickly lost its mobility advantage for this reason. Thus, the QF 18-pounder gun, 
with a large ammunition supply and innovative utilization, became the artillery of choice 
for the same time frame. Even with all the maintenance issues, it has been argued that 
airpower achieved savings in manpower and money through this conflict. Once the war 
officially ended, the Afghan government attempted to become more nationally oriented 
instead of a Muslim caliphate, following Turkey’s lead.95 This just continued to fuel the 
unrest in the tribesman, and continued to be problematic for the British throughout the 
interwar period. 
E. TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION EVALUATION 
Overall, the British military was operating in a resource-deprived environment, in 
a harsh mountainous region, against conventional and irregular enemy forces. 
Furthermore, the British troops fighting this war had limited experience, and had no time 
for training for this specific situation; thus, innovation was necessary for the resources 
they had. The RA and RAF rely on tactical innovation to make the available weapons 
technology effective. 
The mechanization for rapid movement and heavy artillery mobilization did not 
have great success within the Khyber Pass that was expected by the RA. Much of the 
mechanized transport was abandoned just prior to combat due to the mountainous terrain, 
and the RHA became heavily mobilized moving with the cavalry reverting back to direct 
fire operations.96 This change in operation does not seem to surface in doctrine until the 
development of mortar teams introduced following World War II. On the other hand, the 
innovation of air directed fires to enable indirect fire missions in remote regions, lacking 
map and survey data, was incorporated in both the RA and RAF doctrine in 1922.97 This 
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was utilized heavily throughout the Inter War period, as the instability in these areas 
prevented survey teams from developing the maps needed to follow the World War I 
doctrine. 
The RAF incorporated some form of bombing during most missions; yet, the only 
time the service went on the offensive it was strictly bombing runs deep in Afghanistan. 
When the missions were defending British troops, they used a combination of light to 
medium bombing with occasional machine gun strafing runs.98 All of the operations 
during this war, and the continued policing activity following the war can be seen in their 
published doctrine of 1922. More important, the doctrine that was developed clearly 
highlights the RAF role in shaping, defensive and offensive operations. This did not exist 
during the Anglo-Afghan war, and only through innovation did the service find its place. 
It becomes clear that the RAF favored the D.H.9a as it became their main aircraft 
in the Middle East for policing activities following this war, and the B.E.2c was retired.99 
Additionally, the QF 18-Pounder gun was favored by the RA throughout this period well 
into World War II.100 The innovation used by aircrew with the D.H.9a, and other aircraft, 
was captured in their operating procedures, along with their artillery calls-for-fire 
procedures. The innovation by the RHA with the QF 18-Pounder gun was never 
incorporated into any operations manual but it remained a favored technology for some 
time, most likely due to its overall mission flexibility and reliability. Additionally, the use 
of aircraft for indirect fire missions in remote regions was incorporated with joint 
operating procedures being implemented.101 Finally, the RAF ultimately favored one of 
its most advanced aircraft, while the RA favored one of its oldest artillery pieces. What 
does this insinuate about the right-tech solution?  
The preponderance of aircraft and artillery utilization was low- or medium-tech 
throughout this war, as might be expected in a resource-deprived environment. To 
evaluate the technology across time, I utilize a planning framework developed around the 
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shaping, defensive, and offensive operations previously outlined. Looking at the missions 
outlined in current U.S. irregular warfare doctrine, and general planning procedures 
focused on these operations, we are able to evaluate these technologies based on the 
operations outlined above.102 The analysis evaluates the artillery and aircraft utilization 
based on three outlined missions, using commander’s guidance to adjust for battle field 
conditions. This analysis suggests that low-tech is generally more effective; however, in a 
resourced constrained environment, medium- or high-tech may be needed. More specific, 
when looking at the three mission categories independently, two out three times low-tech 
was the best solution because of innovation.103  
Both the RA and RAF weapon system operators were able to use innovative 
tactics and field technology adjustments to enable low- and medium-technology to be 
very effective. Additionally, the high-tech used was only effective when employed in 
specific missions. Most importantly, this highlights the fact that the British were able to 
get to a right-tech solution. Based on the weighted data, the QF 18-Pounder Gun and the 
QF 3.7 Howitzer represent a right-tech solution based on the environment and the 
proposed commander priorities for this conflict.104 However, the British had the 
capability to improve its artillery through more innovation. The light weight design of the 
QF 13-Pounder was desired for maneuverability, but proved unstable and the QF 18-
Pounder became the replacement. A lightweight carriage for the QF 18-Pounder may 
have required less horses while increasing accuracy.  
The same can be said for the Aircraft used. Based on the weighted data, the Royal 
Aircraft B.E.2c and the Airco D.H.9a aircraft represent a right-tech solution based on the 
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environment and the proposed commander priorities for this conflict.105 Adjusting 
technology available to these aircraft made them more effective based on battlefield 
innovation. Cameras were added when intelligence personnel identify the after action 
report conducted by aircrew as a limitation, as a result low-tech cameras were added to 
aircraft. Aircrew could see artillery impacts, and call in adjustments for ground 
personnel; thus, communications equipment was installed on the aircraft. However, little 
was done to address the high altitudes these aircraft were operating in. Portable oxygen 
bottles, like those on the bomber aircraft, may have enabled more operations in the high 
mountains of Afghanistan. Overall, the British were able to adjust their technology 
strategy and employment, which leads to a right-tech solution. 
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IV. IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN 
THE SOVIET UNION’S AFGHAN WAR 
Like the British Empire, Russia, and later the Soviet Empire, had been involved in 
Afghanistan throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. At the conclusion of World War II, 
the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower and by the 1950s, was involved in the Cold 
War with the United States. Afghanistan was a member of the non-aligned nations during 
the Cold War, and this status influenced the international community’s involvement 
throughout the Soviet Afghanistan occupation of the 1980s. Examining the historical 
facts leading to the Soviet Afghanistan invasion of 1979 will emphasize their objectives 
and strategy. Military strategy and doctrine influences technology or weapons systems 
employment; thus, examining their doctrine before and throughout the war helps 
understand the Soviet planned technology integration to facilitate their success. Finally, 
examining the artillery and aircraft technology the Soviet Union used in shaping, 
offensive and defensive operations may highlight some successes and failures of their 
technology employment throughout the war.  
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 due to the instability caused by 
the Afghan civil war and the fear it would spread into the Soviet Union. The Soviets were 
able to quickly remove any conventional threat but soon found themselves involved in a 
long irregular war. The guerrilla fighters managed to wage an irregular war against the 
Soviets for nearly a decade. The Soviets quickly found themselves operating beyond their 
capability when facing the guerrilla fighters and the advanced weapons being supplied by 
external supporters. Throughout the war, the Soviets utilized an Afghan partner force for 
offensive operations against guerrilla fighters in an attempt to legitimize their supported 
Afghan government. Unfortunately, the Afghan forces did little to influence the people of 
Afghanistan, and the guerrilla threat continued to escalate. The Soviet military was 
successful when facing guerrilla fighters in the early stages of the conflict; however, they 
did not adapt their technologies to a changing environment as international involvement 
increased. Operating in a resource constrained environment, the Soviet military was 
initially able to develop a right-tech solution in a relatively short period of time through 
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effective technology integration. They did not adjust this solution when external actors 
changed the technology dynamics. Their failure to adjust enabled the guerrilla fighters to 
potentially have an asymmetric advantage at multiple levels, neutralizing the technology 
advantage of the Soviets. Finally, this failure to adjust to a right-tech solution continued 
to be problematic and ultimately led to the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan 
in 1988.  
A. THE SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONSHIP 
In 1955, the Afghan government agreed to Soviet military and economic aid, and 
by 1957, this alliance was well underway. The Soviet military mission was to reorganize 
and modernize the Afghan Army and Air Force.106 Over the next five years, the Afghan 
military would receive Soviet tanks, guns, military vehicles, aircraft, and updated 
communications equipment. Additionally, the Soviets had nearly 500 military advisors 
within Afghanistan, and the Afghan military grew to over 100,000 personnel under 
Soviet tutelage.107 Finally, an agreement was signed that settled demarcation of the 
Soviet-Afghan border and renewed their treaty of Non-Aggression.108 For the next 
decade, the political, military, and economic relationship between the two countries went 
quite well, with both countries benefiting. However, their relationship all started to 
change as political and social unrest grew within Afghanistan. 
Between 1973 and 1979, political turmoil erupted within Afghanistan due to the 
ongoing civil war, and the existence of multiple external actors only increased the 
turmoil.109 Of these external actors, the Soviet Union had the most direct influence within 
the Afghan government. As the political and social turmoil continued, many Afghans 
found themselves displaced from their homes and were now refugees. The fear of an 
unstable Afghanistan forced Soviet leaders into action, with the intent of stabilizing 
Afghanistan’s government. 
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In 1978, Soviet influence peaked as the Afghan President Muhammad Taraki 
changed the national flag, painted multiple government buildings red, and passed 
multiple reform acts that were communist in nature.110 With the political unrest, and 
refugees unable to flee to surrounding countries, the clan and tribal leaders of 
Afghanistan became enraged. By 1979, Islamist guerrillas were training within Pakistan 
and crossing the border using hit and run tactics in an effort to resist the new communist 
based Afghan government. In reaction, mass arrests and shootings occurred, culminating 
with the killing of the Muslim clergy. Additionally, the Afghan government launched 
large military operations to regain control after guerrilla attacks, resulting in many 
civilian casualties. Finally, in mid-December 1979, the Soviet Union decided to invade 
Afghanistan and install Karmal as the leader of Afghanistan.111  
B. GOING TO WAR 
The Soviet Union took preemptive measures to facilitate their Afghanistan 
invasion of 1979. First, the Soviets attempted to remove any perceived threat from the 
Afghan military. Soviet Afghan advisors and maintenance personnel had most of the 
Afghan military equipment disabled to prevent any formidable military retaliation or 
resistance.112 Second, the Soviet military mobilized and pre-staged a larger military force 
prior to the main Afghanistan invasion. Once the Soviet Union decided to invade they 
increased the number of Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan from roughly 1,500 to 
over 5,000 personnel, plus three airborne assault brigades. These forces secured airfields 
and vital lines of communication to facilitate the invasion force. Finally, measures were 
taken to influence the Afghan populace through political manipulation to include a Soviet 
supported government coup. Additionally, the Soviets used a new special unit, the Soviet 
Muslim brigade, in an effort to win the support of the populace. It was believed that this 
unit, through common religion and dialect, would show the Afghan people that 
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cooperation with the Soviets was possible.113 These pre-invasion operations enabled a 
quick, effective invasion with minimal resistance. 
On 27 December, 1979, the main Soviet invasion force moved into Afghanistan, 
including over 800 tanks and armored vehicles; within a week, nearly 50,000 Soviet 
military personnel arrived in Afghanistan. The Afghan president, Hafizullah Amin, was 
removed from office. On 28 December, the new Afghan president arrived at Bagram air 
base and was escorted to Kabul in a T-72 Soviet tank, escorted by the Soviet military, not 
the Afghan military. Within days, the Soviet military managed to secure all of its 
objectives, and Soviet leaders believed the only real threat to their future operations was 
potential Chinese involvement. Therefore, the order was given for Soviet troops to 
remain within the established military installations, giving priority to defensive 
operations. 
The Soviet military mission was to provide security for all operational air bases, 
all government buildings, and critical lines of communication. This was the extent of 
their defensive operations. Aircraft, helicopter gunships, armored vehicles, and artillery 
were directly used by Soviet forces for the security of these strategic locations. The 
Soviet trained Afghan soldiers and the Special Muslim unit were the only forces 
conducting limited offensive operations, or combating guerrilla forces. By mid-1980, the 
offensive strategic concept basically failed. The Soviets expected their Special Muslim 
unit to win over guerrilla forces; however, just the opposite came to fruition. This unit 
was generally sympathetic to the guerrillas and gave guerrilla fighters Soviet weapons 
and intelligence.114 The Soviet leaders opted to withdraw all Soviet Muslim military 
members following the failures incurred with the Special Muslim unit. Afghan military 
mutinies became frequent, and mutineers often took the Soviet supplied weapons with 
them.115 As a result, Soviet forces deprived the Afghan military of its tanks, missiles, and 
weapons technologies in general. Finally, international pressure was mounting against the 
Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, and Pakistan was taking direct action to 
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support the guerrilla forces.116 Therefore, in July of 1980, the Soviet Union was forced to 
change its political narrative and military operations.117 From this point forward, the 
Soviet military was responsible for all shaping, offensive, and defensive operations. 
C. DOCTRINE LIMITING RIGHT-TECH 
Soviet military doctrine limited successful technology integration in multiple 
ways. The first limiting factor, influenced by World War II, focused on military structure 
and the concept of “the preparation of the rear.” This notion led to a very large military 
footprint, and much of it was non-deployable. The second limiting factor was the Soviet 
focus on infantry and armor as the primary offensive force, with all other military units 
operating strictly as supporting forces. Finally, Soviet military and political leaders based 
their doctrine on limited technology integration, limiting the effectiveness of technology, 
to decrease military expenses. These three factors contributed to the infectiveness of the 
military weapons technology throughout the Soviet-Afghan invasion and stifled internal 
innovation that may have led to a right-tech solution.118 Moreover, the Soviet military did 
not have a doctrine for low-intensity warfare, and was thus forced to use a theater warfare 
doctrine.119 These actions ultimately led the Soviet Air Force and artillery units to 
abandon their doctrine until it was changed in the late 1980s.120  
On September 17, 1939, the Soviets sent their military into Poland as part of a 
significant offensive operation; however, By June 1941, the Soviets were reeling from the 
German invasion. Internal military theorists believed that the Soviets failed to develop 
homeland defenses, with appropriate mobilization measures to enable quick defensive 
actions anywhere within the Soviet Union. According to William Odom on Soviet 
doctrine, “Unless the rear can be defended and its resources mobilized, there is little use 
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in speaking of campaigns elsewhere.”121 In an effort to always have the force structure to 
defend against an invasion while being able to conduct offensive operations, the Soviet 
Union built the largest military force the world had seen since World War I. As a result, 
in 1979 the Soviet military had over five million personnel on active duty, and more the 
55 million in the reserves; additionally, its weapons inventory consisted of more than 
53,000 tanks, and 48,000 tubes of artillery.122 As a comparison, the United States active 
military force was just over two million, and a reserve size of less than one million.123 
Moreover, the Soviets produced four times the number of tanks as the United States. 
Finally, Soviet armor units were assessed to be quantitatively and qualitatively superior 
to the U.S. Army armor units.124 These differences in numbers are far more extreme 
within the Soviet Army compared to their Air Force and Navy. 
Soviet doctrine focused on three continuous land theaters: Europe, the Far East, 
and Southwest Asia. Additionally, “air power, rocketry and naval power have generally 
taken a back seat” when planning and preparing for offensive operations within these 
theaters, and instead focused on tanks and artillery to support infantry advances.125 
Therefore, air power was limited in the Afghan war simply based on numbers, and the 
need to defend the rear. To put it into raw numbers, the Soviet Air Force had 
approximately 6,894 fixed-wing aircraft, and 3,320 helicopters.126 The Soviet Army had 
five times more tanks than their Air Force had aircraft, and ten times more artillery. As a 
final point, the Soviet Air Force lost 118 fighter aircraft and 333 helicopters during the 
war in Afghanistan, while the Army lost 147 tanks and 433 pieces of artillery.127 That is 
significant considering that the Air Force lost ten percent of their helicopter fleet, and the 
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Army lost less than one percent of their armor to include artillery. How much more could 
the Soviets risk, and still protect the rear.  
Due to the cost of operating a large military, the Soviets tried to be cost effective 
with their weapons technology integration and their employment tactics. Unfortunately, 
these employment tactics further exacerbated the problem with weapons technology 
integration. For example, the Soviet Army determined that each piece of artillery required 
ten percent more ammunition for each kilometer over ten kilometers.128 To minimize this 
opportunity, in an effort to cut cost, artillery was deployed as close to the front as 
possible.129 However, in the mountainous environment of Afghanistan the tanks were not 
able to engage targets on the ridge line due to gun limitations. This created a situation 
where the unprotected artillery, not up-armored artillery, was excessively exposed to 
enemy fire.130 Soon this tactic was abandon when towed artillery or MRLS units were the 
only unit available for offensive operations. Additionally, offensive employment tactics 
changed for up-armored tracked artillery due to limited maneuverability in this 
environment.131 The totality of all these problems forced a military dependency on 
airpower. 
The Soviets used airpower, for the first time, as their primary method for 
offensive and shaping operations. The tactics used for these new air operations caused a 
lot of helicopter maintenance issues, increased operational crash rates, and decreased 
weapons accuracy limiting their availability and operational effectiveness.132 The 
increased risk imposed on helicopter aircrew could have been reduced through the 
introduction of electronic countermeasures, and the accuracy issues could have been 
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addressed with forward air controllers. However, neither of these was introduced in this 
conflict. 
On the other hand, there are examples of innovation that increased operational 
capability, reduced risk to personnel and equipment, and by the war’s end influenced 
doctrinal change. During the course of this conflict, artillery units developed new firing 
techniques, a new calculating device for this environment, and firing tables in an effort to 
target an elusive enemy within the mountainous terrain. Overall, these changes made the 
multiple-rocket-launch systems and the towed artillery pieces more accurate, enabled 
quicker targeting, and minimized the number of artillery pieces simultaneously firing. 
Additionally, the introduction of precision-guided munitions had limited success. Finally, 
the self-propelled mortar artillery pieces had the most success through tactical 
employment changes. The new calculating device enabled more effective standoff tactics 
and reduced the risk to force without sacrificing accuracy. However, towed and MRLS 
artillery pieces had minimal protective armor, and even with the new standoff tactics, this 
limited there use for offensive operations conducted in the mountains of Afghanistan.133 
While these innovations and changes increased effectiveness leading to doctrinal 
changes, the data analysis below demonstrates that with minimal modifications, or 
different equipment requests, the multiple-rocket-launch systems could have been far 
more effective. 
D. TECHNOLOGY USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD  
The Afghan Army and Air Force training and equipment mostly originated from 
the Soviet Union. The military structure was very similar to the Soviet structure to 
include their doctrine, training, and export weapons systems. As the political and social 
turmoil grew within Afghanistan, the loyalty of the military force waned, and desertion or 
mutiny became very common after 1973.134 Additionally, the Soviet Union had military 
advisors and embedded maintenance personnel in the Afghan forces throughout the pre-
invasion period. These factors were exploited by the Soviet planers for the main invasion. 
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The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27 December, 1979, and by the New Year the 
Afghan military was working with the Soviet military. Guerrilla forces were the only true 
opposition to the Soviet Union. As the conflict continued, international support for 
insurgents, or guerrilla forces opposing Soviet forces in Afghanistan, grew extensively. 
Initially, guerrilla forces possessed only small arms such as the AK-47, but even 
these were in small supply as the Afghan civil war had depleted much of the tribal 
munitions. This changed as Pakistan, China, and Iran became directly threatened by the 
Soviet invasion. Pakistan, and to a lesser degree Iran, became safe havens for insurgents 
fighting the Soviet forces. The Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) was training 
insurgents and sending them to Afghanistan with weapons supplied by China.135 In July 
of 1980, the Soviets transitioned from invasion to stability operations, and the guerrilla 
forces started to receive weapons and aid from more external actors to include the United 
States. By 1982, the Mujahideen was receiving $600 million a year from the United 
States in weapons and training supplies.136 This significantly improved the mujahedeen’s 
ability to continue a successful insurgency against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 
Low-tech weapons requiring minimal training were generally best suited for these 
guerrilla fighters; additionally, the external actors did not want the Soviets to know they 
were supporting the guerrillas and limited the type of weapons to those of Soviet 
origin.137 Thus, the main weapons supplied to guerrilla forces were mortars, rocket-
propelled grenade launchers (RPG), Degtyaryov-Shpagin (DShKM) 12.7mm heavy 
machine guns, and ZPU 14.5mm heavy machine guns. As the Soviet-Afghan war 
continued, Soviet weapon availability became limited, and the origins of a weapons 
system no longer became a determining factor. Pakistan ISI established training centers 
for guerrilla fighters, and this enabled the introduction of more complex weapons 
systems. By the mid-1980s, guerrilla fighters had 107mm Chinese multiple rocket 
launchers (MBRL), Russian Strela-2 surface-to-air-missiles (SAM), and the United States 
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Stinger SAMs.138 While there was a technology shift for the guerrilla fighters, it came at 
a cost. Guerrilla fighters were required to go through training in Pakistan, which removed 
them from the fight, and the external actors controlled the inflow of weapons. 
Additionally, it created a requirement for logistics to move the weapons into place for use 
in both training and combat. 
The Soviet military weapons technology integration had dramatically increased 
between World War II and the 1979 Afghanistan invasion, possibly due to the ongoing 
Cold War. However, the Soviets did not utilize all military forces or technology that was 
available to them. The Soviets primarily utilized eleven different artillery pieces during 
this war.139 Additionally, they tended to maneuver with mostly medium-tech supported 
by low- or high-tech artillery units. Maneuvering units utilized self-propelled howitzers 
or mortar artillery, with support from defensive artillery units.140 The defensive units 
utilized medium-tech artillery to support maneuvering units, and utilized their high-tech 
for counterbattery missions. 
As for the Soviet Air Force, they mostly used ten aircraft types during this 
conflict.141 The Soviets utilized low- to high-tech aircraft throughout most operations, 
with no clear separation by mission type. The Cub and Hound were the oldest aircraft 
utilized by the Soviets, and were both low- to medium-tech. The Frogfoot was the newest 
aircraft in the Soviet inventory, and was definitely high-tech. This does not include all 
aircraft utilized by the Soviets. There are reports of medium to long range bombers 
operating out of the Soviet Union during major offensive operation.142 While these 
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aircraft fit into shaping operations, their limited use over the ten year conflict prevents 
any real data analysis. Additionally, their operating environment was significantly 
different, as takeoff and landing was in the Soviet Union with much better airfield 
operations. 
1. Artillery Technology 
During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Soviets divided their artillery into three 
distinct groups: the Regimental Artillery Group (RAG), the Division Artillery Group 
(DAG), and the Army Artillery Group (AAG). Understanding this structure helps identify 
the limitations of the technology employed by the Soviets during this conflict. RAGs 
generally consisted of two to four battalions, each battalion consisting of 240 to 260 
personnel with 18 artillery pieces. RAGs targeted enemy personnel or equipment that 
hindered the advance of attacking Soviet forces, referred to as a maneuvering unit. These 
may have been shaping fires, done well in advance or during the offensive. RAGs were 
generally concerned with short range requirements. DAGs, referred to as defensive units, 
consisted of two to four battalions with the same general structure as RAGs; however, 
DAGs may have been required to support an AAG during defensive operations, or a 
RAG during offensive operations. DAGs generally had medium to long range artillery, 
and could assume the role of an AAG for mobile units. AAGs were made up of 
remaining allocated artillery battalions not pushed down to a DAG or RAG. The AAG 
mission was generally defensive counterbattery or attacking deep targets; thus, they were 
made up of longer range artillery pieces. Each of these units always employed a Fire 
Direction Center (FDC) to coordinate fires from all supporting artillery pieces, even 
when operating independently of the main force.143 Below is a comprehensive overview 
of each piece of artillery, for a complete review of artillery capabilities see Table 3 in 
Appendix A. 
The M-46, 2B9, D-20, D-30 and RPU-14 are towed pieces of artillery utilized by 
the Soviet military during this war. With the exception of the RPU-14, these artillery 
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pieces are gun based artillery weapons. The D-20 and D-30 are howitzers, which have the 
capability of shooting up high ridgelines thanks to their extended elevation ranges. The 
M-46 is more of a traditional artillery gun with a limited elevation range, making it more 
suited for direct-fire missions. The 2B9 is an advanced automatic 82mm gun-mortar 
piece with a four round clip and the largest elevation range within these towed artillery 
pieces.144 Finally, the RPU-14 is a towed variant of the BM-14 comprised of a 140mm 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The RPU-14 is limited by rocket rang and not 
its elevation. The RPU-14 was replaced during this war by the BM-21.145 While the 
RPU-14 may be considered medium-tech due to its rocket technology, the rest of these 
artillery pieces represent low-tech artillery utilized by the Soviet military during the 
Soviet Afghan war, and all benefit from low maintenance and simplicity.  
The 2S1, 2S3, 2S4, and 2S9 are all track-style, self-propelled artillery pieces. The 
2S1 through 2S4 entered service well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 2S9 
did not enter service until 1981, and did not enter this conflict until 1984.146 The 2S9 is 
the lightest, fastest, most maneuverable artillery piece of the tracked units, with the 
highest rate of fire.147 The 2S1 is a close second with a near equal rate of fire, its larger 
caliber rounds, and its longer range compared to the 2S9. These two artillery pieces have 
the same travel distance and max speeds, but the 2S1 is double the weight and sacrifices 
maneuverability. The 2S3 and 2S4 are much heavier artillery pieces with much slower 
rates of fire; they would likely be used for counterbattery missions or deep target 
destruction. Additionally, the 2S4 had PGM rounds.148 All of the S-series artillery pieces 
utilized by the Soviets in this conflict are medium-tech unless using PGMs. The 2S4 
utilizing PGMs would have been high-tech during this war. 
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The BM-21 and BM-27 are self-propelled wheel-based MRLS artillery pieces 
utilized in this war. The BM-21 is a 40-round 122mm MLRS that entered service in the 
mid-1960s, offered short and long range rockets, and is still in service today. The truck 
based unit carried two full ammo loads for a total of 80 rockets, had a max speed of 46 
MPH, and a max range of 251 miles. The BM-27 is a 16-round 220mm MLRS that 
entered service in the mid-1970s, and is still in service. The BM-27 also offered short and 
long range rockets, had a max speed of 40 MPH, and a max range of 310 miles.149 The 
BM-21 was medium-tech, and the BM-27 was high-tech during this war. 
2. Aircraft Technology 
The Soviet military aircraft employed in this war fall into three categories: airlift, 
fighter, and rotary-wing. These aircraft were not locked into a specific mission role as 
these categories may suggest, and examining these aircraft through shaping, offensive 
and defensive operations helps identify their mission effectiveness. Fighter aircraft 
tended to be faster, and smaller than other fixed-wing aircraft. Additionally, they tended 
to have more advanced weapons systems for multirole capability. Airlift aircraft tended 
to be larger aircraft with longer flight duration. Airlift aircraft also had higher payloads, 
and required less maintenance support; however, they were less maneuverable with the 
least mission flexibility, generally restricting them to lift operations. Finally, rotary-wing 
aircraft were used as transport, reconnaissance, and strike aircraft making them appear to 
be the most mission flexible; however, they tended to be payload limited, with shorter 
flight durations and limited altitude capabilities. Below is a comprehensive overview of 
each aircraft utilized by the Soviet military in this war. For a complete capability review 
of each aircraft, see Table 3 in Appendix B. 
The first aircraft used in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were airlift assets 
shaping the military force up to three weeks prior to the planed invasion. The Il-76 
Candid was utilized extensively throughout this conflict, and was the only jet engine 
equipped airlift aircraft used. The Candid moved over seventy percent of all cargo and 
personnel moved by air; additionally, it could carry heavy loads while still operating on 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 682-686. 
 58
short unpaved poorly maintained runways. While the Candid moved the most cargo 
throughout the war, the An-22 Cock was favored during the initial invasion. When the 
An-22 entered service it was the largest turboprop aircraft; furthermore, with its unique 
twelve wheel main landing gear setup, this aircraft could land on soft unprepared 
surfaces. Finally, the An-12 Cub was the smallest of the aircraft utilized for intra-theater 
airlift. This aircraft proved to be a multirole aircraft, as it performed airlift, 
reconnaissance, and bombing runs during this war.150 The An-12 was the oldest airlift 
aircraft utilized during this war, and formed the “backbone” of the Soviet mobility 
command.151 The An-12 Cub is low-tech, while the An-22 and Il-76 are both medium-
tech. The An-22 Cocks complex landing gear brings this aircraft up to medium-tech, and 
the dirt strip cable engines of the Il-76 reduce it to medium-technology. 
The rotary-wing aircraft were use more than any other type of aircraft in offensive 
and defensive operations. The Mi-4 (Hound) was the oldest rotary-wing aircraft used in 
this war. The Hound is a single engine transport helicopter, and the Mi-8 (Hip) was 
designed to replace it. The Hound went out of production in 1979, but remained in 
service throughout this war. The Hip is a twin-engine design with increased lift and 
mission capability compared to the Hound. The Hip could carry double the payload, and 
eight more passengers; however, it had a lower altitude capability, and shorter flight 
duration. The Hip also had rockets and anti-tank missiles for use in conjunction with 
personnel insertion during offensive operations, or for rapid base defense operations. The 
Mi-24 (Hind) is a gunship attack helicopter. While its mission design is focused on 
attack, the Hind does have transport capability. The Hind can carry half the personnel of 
the Hound, but more weight. The Hind is in the middle with respect to altitude capability, 
but was the fastest most complex rotary-wing used in this conflict. The weapons system 
was so complex it required a weapons officer in addition to the two pilots, but it was very 
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effective.152 Finally, the Hind is an all-weather helicopter, and is the least vulnerable to 
small arms fire. These two capabilities prove to be very problematic for the other Soviet 
helicopters.153 The Mi-4 Hound was low-tech at the time of this conflict. The Hip was 
medium-tech with its twine engine and weapons capabilities. Finally, the Hind was high-
tech due to its advanced engine and weapons system design.  
The MiG-23 Flogger and Su-17 Fitter were the oldest fighters used in this 
conflict. The primary mission of the Flogger was air-to-air operations with limited air-to-
ground operations.154 The Fitter was primarily used for air-to-ground operations, 
supporting ground troops or performing bombing runs. The Su-25 Frogfoot was the 
newest, only close-air-support (CAS) designed fighter utilized by the Soviets during this 
war. The Frogfoot proved more agile and accurate compared to the Fitter; however, the 
Fitter proved to be more reliable in the harsh Afghanistan environment.155 There were 
more Su-25 Frogfoot aircraft within Afghanistan than any other aircraft, and was 
primarily used for ground attack; however, with full weapons load, its altitude was 
limited to 16,500 feet.156 The Su-24 Fencer was designed as a high speed low-level strike 
aircraft, and was utilized in the mid-1980s as a replacement for the Fitter. The Fencer had 
electronic countermeasures for ground-to-air threats, and a shorter takeoff capability than 
the Fitter; however, much like the Frogfoot, the Fencer was not as reliable as the Fitter. 
All of these aircraft are high-tech for this conflict; however, the Frogfoot is the most 
advanced with respect to CAS support, and the Flogger is the most advanced with respect 
to air-to-air engagements.  
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3. Military Operational Integration 
This conflict had five distinct phases. The first phase is pre-invasion through mid-
1980. The second phase, mid-1980 through late 1982, the Soviets were fighting an 
offensive and defensive conflict with the weapons technology planned only for defensive 
operations. While there was a quick shift to achieve needed manpower during this phase, 
the approval and logistics for the weapons took much longer. It was late 1982 before the 
weapons strength would grow to adjust for the new operational strategy.157 The third 
phase, late 1982 through early 1984, the Soviet weapons technology shifts and becomes 
very effective on the battle field. During this phase the Mujahideen were working with 
external actors in an effort to counter the new Soviet capabilities.158 The fourth phase, 
early 1984 through late 1985, the Mujahideen fielded new counter air weapons 
technology to include heavy machineguns and the SA-7. The heavy machine guns could 
employ easily against air or ground forces. The fifth phase, late 1985 through the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1988, the Mujahideen fielded their final counter air weapon, the Stinger.159 
Most of the daily fighting took place in eastern Afghanistan, in the mountains near the 
Pakistani border, and within or near major cities throughout the war. Thus, these areas, 
along with military base and lines-of-communication (LOC) defense, are the focus areas 
for examining technology effectiveness.160 
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, their military forces quickly set a 
defensive posture. Soviet troops remained within established bases, and aircraft and 
artillery were used to secure these locations along with vital LOCs. Large artillery pieces 
protected key locations along the LOCs, and aircraft supported convoys moving along 
them. As pointed out earlier, the Soviets changed to an offensive and defensive role due 
to the ineffectiveness of previous measures, and Soviet forces swelled to over 100,000. 
While there was a large increase in military force, less than 1,000 personnel participated 
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in offensive operations on a daily bases and large offensive operations did not exceed 
7,000.161 Furthermore, barely 10 percent of active military personnel served in 
Afghanistan, and Soviet military members would rotate back to the Soviet Union every 
six months.162 These are important points, as it hampers innovation on the battle field 
when personnel are not committed to the conflict holistically. Finally, with such a limited 
force conducting offensive operations, the tactics changed very little to enable more 
effective offensive operations; rather, they only changed tactics to limit risk, and 
sacrificed accuracy in the process.163 
The small offensive forces were a deliberate tactical change that developed during 
the second stage of the conflict. This developed from the failures of large conventional 
type units moving into the mountains north of Kabul in an attempt to push out guerrilla 
fighters. Prior to this tactical change, the typical offensive operation consisted of 5,000 
personnel. The Soviets would shoot howitzer based artillery, such as the 2S1 and 2S9, 
into the mountains for three to four days; additionally, air assets would bomb any 
location needed that was out of range for the artillery. The caves in the area provided 
security to guerrilla fighters, and the shaping fires served as a warning of an enemy 
attack. Helicopters would insert small tactical units along ridgelines and on building tops 
for over watch during these large offensive operations, however, these operations failed 
to block the withdrawal of guerrilla forces.  
During the typical offensive advance, spotters on the ridge lines would call for 
artillery as targets appeared. The artillery units were using normative firing tables as 
spotters called for artillery. These firing tables were designed for large targets where only 
general accuracy was needed. This meant artillery units had to use heavy bombardment 
for small targets. The Mujahideen would use 20 to 200 personnel to attack during the 
night, a smaller force than Soviet artillery tactics were designed for, allowing them to slip 
away. Additionally, the guerrilla fighters developed a tactic of splitting off a rear portion 
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of its fleeing units to throw off Soviet surveillance units. This enabled a successful 
withdrawal under heavy artillery bombardment.164  
In one of the largest offensive operations during this stage, the battle for Panjshir 
Valley, the Soviets sent in 15,000 troops, 150 Mi-24 gunships, and towed artillery. The 
fighting lasted about six weeks. The Soviets suffered 3,000 casualties, lost 50 vehicles, 
and 35 helicopters. Additionally, large numbers of Afghan regulars defected.165 Soviet 
tactics were not designed for mountainous environments, like that of Afghanistan, which 
limited their effectiveness. The guerrilla forces, with small arms, mortars and RPGs, 
inflicted enough casualties to stop the Soviet offensive prior to clearing the region. 
Besides these large offensive operations, the Soviets continued to expand their 
defensive measures around major cities and LOCs. They built a three layer defensive 
posture around Kabul that stretch 20 miles outside the city. It included bunkers, gun 
emplacements, and mines. The mission for over 60 percent of Soviet forces was to secure 
Kabul and the roads linking it to Kandahar and Herat.166 Yet, insurgents were continually 
able to carry out successful shootings, bombings, and assassinations. As the defensive 
measures proved ineffective, the Soviets turned to its Air Force to reduce guerrilla 
resources through large bombing campaigns. The Soviets targeted key guerrilla support 
infrastructure including irrigation systems, orchards, cropland, farms, villages and 
livestock. The Soviet Air Force believed by targeting these resources, the local 
population would stop supporting the guerrilla forces and the overall insurgent resistance 
would collapse.167 However, this also created large refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran 
that served as resistance recruiting grounds outside the Soviet influence; additionally, the 
bombing campaigns upset the international community due to their harsh nature, and 
civilian casualties.  
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By late 1982, the start of the third stage, the approval from the Soviet government 
finally allocates more resources; additionally, new logistical routes and capabilities 
became available. This sped up the Soviet logistical operations in support of the Afghan 
campaign. Armored self-propelled artillery, along with unarmored MRLS units, started 
pouring into Afghanistan. These self-propelled artillery pieces proved to be far more 
effective in the mountainous regions than tanks. The main guns on Soviet tanks were 
generally limited in elevation, and could not be effectively employed against guerrilla 
units. However, the unarmored MRLS units needed protection from the armored units as 
they maneuvered to engage guerrilla fighters. With tanks unable to protect the MRLS 
units, they eventually become defensive weapons for outposts. This is also true of towed 
artillery, such as the D-30. These vehicle mounted MRLS units could respond quickly to 
an attack with their direct fire effectiveness; yet, be protected by other outpost defensive 
measures.168 Ultimately, this was a wasteful use of this artillery. These units only needed 
minor modification, for protection, to enable their use in offensive operations. 
The Soviets found they needed the effectiveness of an MRLS unit, and its 
accuracy, in their offensive units; yet, they needed better protection against direct attack. 
This stage sees the introduction of the 2S4 armored self-propelled artillery battery. These 
units had the capability of effective indirect fire from the rear of an offensive if needed, 
as they were a gun based piece of artillery. Moreover, they had laser-guided rounds that 
proved very effective at destroying enemy strong points with direct fire. Finally, they 
were more protected against enemy direct attack when compared to the vehicle mounted 
MRLS artillery pieces.169 The 2S4 did have its own limitations, its range was slightly 
limited compared to the MRLS pieces, and its rate of fire was extremely limited. 
Comparing the BM-21 Grand to the 2S4, the BM-21 out ranged the 2S4 by 2,000 meters, 
and could fire all 40 rockets in less than a minute; yet, it had not self-protection or 
indirect fire capability. 
Air assets also increased during this time, bringing Soviet airpower up to 281 
fighters, 220 helicopters including 48 gunships, and 76 transport and reconnaissance 
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aircraft.170 While the increase in assets was an effort to improve overall military strength, 
it was also due to reliability issues that developed from shifting combat tactics. The Hind 
was vulnerable to small arms fire from the side, when being engaged by enemy personnel 
on ridge lines at a co-altitude. Small arms fire from above and below were not as 
problematic. Hind helicopter gunship crewmember found that flying lower and faster 
made them less vulnerable to small arms fire in the mountainous regions. However, they 
did not train for this type of flying, and it led to more accidents. The rotors on the Hind 
were not meant for prolonged low-level flight either and it led to maintenance issues. 
Finally, this new tactic also meant changing target engagement tactics, and their new 
target engagement tactics reduced accuracy. The reduction in accuracy and reliability was 
adjusted for with increased numbers, and the Hind became very effective at combating 
guerrilla fighters and at providing over watch for ground troops.171 
The fighter aircraft shifted to a fighter and bomber type mission set that included 
ground support. However, the speed and threat of small arms fire made it difficult for the 
aircraft to provide effective air cove for ground troops in the mountains. Therefore, they 
shifted missions to heavy indiscriminate bombing on villages in the flat land regions, and 
along guerrilla supply lines in the mountains.172 Additionally, large bombing campaigns 
were conducted against larger cities, like Herat, that might show support to the 
insurgents. While these were brutal tactics, the aircraft performing these bombing 
campaigns performed very well.173 Finally, the Frogfoot and the Fitter had proved the 
most effective fixed-wing aircraft at performing CAS. This led to an additional Frogfoot 
unit deploying to Afghanistan, doubling the number of Su-25 aircraft in country. The 
Frogfoot was much slower than the other fighter aircraft, and was able to be more 
effective supporting ground personnel in all environments. The Fitter had far less 
maintenance issues caused by the harsh environmental conditions, and was heavily 
utilized for ground support when the Frogfoot was unavailable. 
                                                 
170 O’Ballance, Afghan Wars 1839–1992: What Britain Gave Up and the Soviet Union Lost, 122. 
171 Nelson, Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan, 30–44. 
172 Olsen, Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East, 7. 
173 Westermann, The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 
1979–89, 5–7. 
 65
By late 1984, the fourth stage of the war, the Mujahideen starts fielding weapons 
provided by external actors to counter the Soviet air campaign. Multiple variants of 
Soviet heavy machine guns, RPGs, and the SA-7 make their way into the mountains of 
Afghanistan as the Mujahideen start to counter the Soviet air threat. By early 1985 the 
Soviets are losing 150–200 aircraft to enemy fire per year. Finally, by late 1985, the fifth 
stage of the war, the U.S. provided the stinger missile to the Mujahideen. While the 
supply of stinger missiles remains limited, the volume gradually increased throughout 
1986–87.174 Additionally, the Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan did not have 
countermeasures that were effective against the stinger. As a result, Soviet air tactics shift 
again, along with a political narrative shift. Aircraft were more vulnerable to the Stinger 
missile at low level with high engine output due to the increased inferred signature. No 
helicopter was safe flying close to the ground, and they shift to high flying; additionally, 
they start employing their weapons at near max range making them less effective.175 
The political narrative shift is important as it has potential influence on external 
actors. In 1985 the Soviets have a new leader, and this could be the cause of the narrative 
shift; however, it is also plausible that the Soviet government is trying to stop the external 
support for the Mujahideen.176 Following this political shift, there was a force surge in 
1985 that increased offensive operations for nearly a year. However, this quickly feel off 
as there is a shift to end the war.177 Some have also suggested the Soviets adopted a 
hearts and minds campaign in an effort to persuade the local populace to support the 
Afghan government.178 The Soviets adopted a risk limited counterinsurgency campaign 
for the next three years, and seek political action within the international community. 
With the campaign shift, artillery was primarily used for defensive purposes, much as it 
had at the beginning of the war. Additionally, the air bombings become very limited, only 
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used as shaping operations for Afghan forces.179 However, after five years of unrestricted 
bombing, this narrative shift did little to sway the existing opinion of the Afghan people. 
The Mujahideen continued to recruit fighters, and find safe houses with the Afghan 
community. Moreover, in 1987 the U.S. support for the Mujahideen still exceeds $2.5 
billion in value; therefore, no action was effective in removing the external actors support 
either.180 Finally, in 1988 the Soviet Union has grown tired of the war in Afghanistan, 
and withdrawals from the conflict. 
E. TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION EVALUATION 
The Soviet military was operating in a resource-limited environment, in a harsh 
mountainous region, against an irregular force with strong external support. Additionally, 
Soviet troops did not have much experience in counterinsurgency warfare. The Soviets 
military quickly finds a right-tech solution in the opening stages of the war, as this was 
mostly a conventional operation to neutralize the Afghan military. However, the war 
shifts from conventional to irregular as guerrilla fighters become their opposition. For the 
next five years the Soviets continued to operate as if they were still in a conventional war, 
and depended on innovation to overcome limitations. During this time, the Hind and 
Frogfoot were the primary strike aircraft, and the Cub was the primary lift and 
intelligence aircraft. The armored artillery was utilized for offensive operations, where 
towed and MRLS pieces were favored for shaping and defensive operations. 
The Soviet military was successful in overcoming some technological limitations 
through tactical innovation. The Air Force innovated with the Hind by placing it into 
multiple roles which proved to be very effective. Their tactical innovation reduced the 
risk of being shot down, and initially increased weapons effectiveness. The Air Force 
also innovated with the Cub, using it to drop bombs. The Cub proved very effective as a 
strike aircraft, and enabled other offensive operations through this new role. The Soviet 
Army also found effectiveness in their armored artillery for offensive operations through 
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tactical innovation. The Army was able to adjust artillery type and positioning to 
overcome identified defensive limitations of their MRLS artillery.  
While these tactical innovations offered quick solutions to technology limitations 
for short term gains, they also decreased their effectiveness over the long run through 
attrition and miss-application. It would have been more effective to modify their weapons 
technology and training to coincide with the new tactics, or change weapons systems for 
better equipped technologies that addressed these shortfalls. Expanding the Hind’s role 
decreased the reliability of the aircraft due to the increased stress on the airframe, and the 
associated maintenance costs. No testing was ever conducted on the Hind in this new 
tactical environment to fix any equipment deficiencies. Additionally, there was a shift to 
the Frogfoot due to new anti-aircraft weapons threats; unfortunately, it was not equipped 
with an advanced countermeasure system. More importantly, the Hind offered more 
mission flexibility and accuracy in this environment compared to the Frogfoot.181 It 
would have been more practical to equip the Hind with a more advanced countermeasure 
system and integrate it with well-developed tactics, than to shift to the Frogfoot.182 
Another modification may have included increasing the strike capability of the Cub. The 
British and the U.S. militaries were operating a strike aircraft similar to the Cub airframe 
at this time; yet, the Soviets never developed this capability.183 While the Soviets did 
utilize the Cub for bomb dropping, they did not develop any other strike system for this 
aircraft. This suggests the Soviets had focused only on conventional warfare aircraft 
systems integration. 
Artillery could have been much more effective as well. Armored artillery became 
favored due to a lack of self-defense for the MRLS pieces against small arms fire. The 
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technical analysis suggests they should have modified the MRLS pieces.184 In fact, the 
Soviets had an armored vehicle with an integrated MRLS; however, it was never 
introduced in this conflict. Additionally, the data supports the 2B9 mortar system for 
defensive fires with its high rate of fire, and accuracy; however, the Soviets favored the 
MRLS pieces and towed artillery for this role. The MRLS units transitioned to this role 
due to their lack of defensive capabilities. The BM-21 Grad also needed minor 
modifications to make it more effective. It was well integrated in the artillery units, and 
was far more effective than the lumbering giants that resembled that of a tank; 
additionally, they could have requested the armored variant that was in service during this 
conflict. Finally, the Grad has a much lower operating cost compared to the heavy 
armored units utilized by the Soviets. The Grad became an underutilized defensive 
artillery when its mobility, accuracy, and high rate of fire clearly gave it an offensive 
advantage. 
Ultimately, it was the unpopularity of the war, and its cost that led to the political 
decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Mujahideen managed to win by not 
losing.185 With that understanding, one might argue that the Soviet Union technology 
level did not matter; however, this would be a false assumption.186 The Soviets started 
this conflict with a large technological asymmetric advantage over the Mujahedeen, but it 
gradually diminishes over the ten year conflict. The weapons technology utilized by the 
Mujahedeen continually changes throughout this conflict, which was enabled by the 
support from external actors.187 The Soviet forces in Afghanistan did very little to change 
their technology as the war continued, and instead relied on tactical innovation. While 
these innovations offered quick adjustments on the battlefield to overcome technological 
limitations, they failed to address the larger problem. By not adjusting their technology, 
                                                 
184 See Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix A for all artillery technical analysis. If the Soviet Army had 
access to the armored MRLS system in their inventory, no tactical innovation would have been needed to 
overcome technology limitations. Artillery units completely changed weapons technology utilized for each 
mission when it only required the substitution of one weapons technology. 
185 Lester W. Grau, “Breaking Contact without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 2 (2007), 235–261. 
186 Leshuk, Stinger Missiles in Afghanistan, 11. 
187 Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation, 155. 
 69
either through modification or replacement, they failed to maintain a right-tech solution. 
Furthermore, the tactical innovation tended to strain the weapon systems they did have, 
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V. IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY IN 
THE UNITED STATES-AFGHAN WAR 
Much like the other two case studies, the United States involvement in 
Afghanistan involved counterinsurgency warfare. U.S. intelligence personnel were 
collecting information within Afghanistan, and international involvement was attempting 
to limit Taliban or Al Qaeda acts of terror, but all these actions were preventative or 
defensive in nature until September 2001. Examining the historical facts leading to the 
United States war on terror within Afghanistan is important, as it will highlight 
limitations imposed on government agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and DOD by the U.S. government; furthermore, it will show how international 
involvement both helped and hindered offensive operations to potentially remove 
Afghanistan as a terrorist safe haven. Examining military doctrine and the artillery and 
aircraft technology the United States used in operations may highlight some successes 
and failures of their technology utilization and integration.  
Much like the Soviet Union, the United States was able to remove any 
conventional threat to its military forces fairly quickly, and then found itself in a long 
irregular war that officially ended in 2014.188 The United States developed an Afghan 
government and military partner force to assist with the Afghan campaign in an effort to 
stabilize the country; yet, they have not been able to achieve this due to guerrilla fighters 
and external supporters. The United States arguably is one of the most technologically 
advanced militaries, yet continues to struggle in preventing Afghanistan from returning to 
a terrorist safe haven. The U.S. military force in Afghanistan has been operating in a 
resources deprived environment; however, it has consistently fielded new weapons 
technologies throughout this conflict. The technologies provided to the allied forces were 
in an effort to limit risk to both civilian and military personnel, but not necessarily to 
limit resources. Unfortunately, these new technologies may not have increased military 
capability, and in some cases may have degraded capability. This failure to adjust to a 
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right-tech solution may lead to the United States to withdrawing from Afghanistan 
without meeting its objectives. 
A. AFGHANISTAN, THE TALIBAN, AND AL QAEDA 
By February 1989, all Soviet forces had departed Afghanistan, yet the Najib 
Afghan regime it established was still in place. The supported guerrilla fighters soon had 
elections to claim leadership rights within Afghanistan; nonetheless, Najib was still 
running the country, and receiving aid from the Soviets. The Najib regime managed to 
hold on for three more years, and was finally overthrown April 15, 1992. Following the 
end of this communist based regime, the United States and Soviet Union mostly 
withdrew from Afghanistan, and regional powers became more involved. Pakistan, Iran, 
and Uzbekistan were the dominate actors during this time: “Inside Afghanistan, the 
extremist versions of Islam exported to Afghanistan from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran now competed with each other and with the mild, indigenous Afghan Hanafi 
order.”189 Ethnic and sectarian conflict consumed Afghanistan for the next nine years. 
By the mid-1990s, Pakistan was sponsoring the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
organizations within Afghanistan. It has even been suggested that the Taliban was more 
than just sponsored, rather it was a proxy of Pakistan operating through the ISI.190 The 
United States was interacting with Pakistan diplomatically, warning them they were in 
danger of being put on the U.S. terrorist list. Al Qaeda was added to the terrorist list in 
1997, after receiving credible information of its involvement in embassy bombings, plots 
to assassinate the U.S. president, and potential links to the 1994 twin tower bombing.191 
From 1998–2001, the CIA was operating covertly within the region in an attempt to 
capture Osama bin Laden.192 
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B. GOING TO WAR 
While there were multiple attacks by Al Qaeda operatives throughout the 1990s, 
the attack on September 11, 2001, would launch the United States into a “war on terror.” 
On this date, nineteen Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four domestic flights, and killed 
2,973 people in just over an hour.193 Following these attacks, the national security 
machine scrambled to understand and to retaliate against Al Qaeda. By the September 
attack, the CIA had established over a hundred sources within eight tribal networks in 
Afghanistan, and this would enable a quick U.S. response. The U.S. President approved 
CIA paramilitary teams to work with opposition forces, such as the Northern Alliance, 
within Afghanistan. These paramilitary teams paved the way for SOF teams, and enabled 
future airstrikes.194  
The President also approved a DOD four-phase plan that focused on eliminating 
Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorist activity. The first two phases spanned the first 
three months of operations; phase three and four were much longer. Phase one focused on 
prestaging troops and assets, while the CIA conducted their initial operations. Phase two 
focused on SOF team integration, with CIA assistance, to direct precision aerial attacks. 
During phase one, other personnel continued to push the Taliban to separate itself from 
Al Qaeda; however, these efforts failed, and the Taliban were quickly added to the 
targeting lists. Finally, diplomatic efforts secured all necessary fly over permissions from 
various countries, and basing was secured in Uzbekistan, Oman, and the Persian Gulf. 
The CIA was able to insert its paramilitary teams by September 28, the air campaign was 
to begin October 7, and the SOF teams were to quickly follow.195 
October 7, 2001, the United States started its operational campaign within 
Afghanistan. The first night of operations struck thirty one predetermined targets utilizing 
air assets and cruise missiles.196 Other air assets were utilized to jam enemy radar 
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systems and communications, and to provide a secure communications network for 
friendly forces. These operations were to establish absolute control of the air over 
Afghanistan through neutralizing the Taliban’s air defenses. Targets included surface-to-
air missile (SAM) sites, enemy air bases, and enemy aircraft. By the third day, air 
operations were being conducted during daylight hours, and the targeting list had 
expanded to include the Taliban military academy, enemy defensive artillery units, and 
possible training camps. By the fifth day, cave complexes were being bombed containing 
Al Qaeda personnel, and by the seventh night SOF air assets were finding and executing 
real-time targets. During this time troops and air assets were forward deployed to 
Uzbekistan, Oman, and the Persian Gulf in preparation for ground operations. These 
forward locations were needed to enable future SOF operations internal to Afghanistan. 
On October 17, the first SOF team was inserted into Afghanistan, and AC-130 aircraft 
attacked inhabited Taliban garrisons.197 This was the beginning of phase two operations. 
SOF personnel now acted as forward air controllers, and would positively identify 
target and clear aircraft for engagement. These forward air controllers were operating 
through Afghanistan, and a process was in place for the DOD and CIA to confirm all 
targets. Additionally, SOF aircraft were cleared to strike dynamic targets without the use 
of a forward air controller, and other air assets had a list of actionable targets enable by 
the SOF teams. By late October, forces would parachute into Kandahar and Mazar-i-
Sharif and eliminate Taliban strong holds. Additionally, the Northern Alliance, with 
embedded SOF teams, would take the offensive securing Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and 
Kabul by late November. Finally, in late November, the first Forward Operating Base 
(FOB) was selected within Afghanistan, and approximately 1,200 conventional U.S. 
Marines were inserted to reinforce the SOF team that occupied this location. Up until this 
point, there were less than 200 U.S. personnel on the ground inside Afghanistan, and by 
December there would be multiple FOBs with operating air strips.198 SOF teams 
continued to be vital during the Afghan campaign; yet, with the introduction of 
                                                 
197 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 80–93. 
198 Ibid., 94–147. 
 75
conventional forces, the war moved into phase three, and the operations began to shift to 
a conventional international campaign. 
C. DOCTRINE LIMITING RIGHT-TECH 
In Chapter I, the review of current U.S. military doctrine discussed the gap in 
today’s military’s ability to integrate technology; additionally, it highlights the lack of a 
sound technology strategy. In fact, the preponderance of military and civilian leaders 
continued to push for high-tech solutions in the opening stages of this conflict, and the 
national security strategy pushed for high-tech solutions throughout the Bush 
administration.199 Yet, some of the technology integration strategies limited or delayed 
operations in this conflict. While the United States did respond to the 2001 attacks in less 
than thirty days, the original planed response was delayed by more than a week.200 The 
U.S. had the capability to respond on its original planned time table; however, the 
military pushed for the delay based on other supporting technologies. 
The review in Chapter II demonstrated the inconsistencies in U.S. understanding 
of irregular warfare. Historically, the United States’ military branches have divorced 
themselves from irregular warfare following their withdrawal from this type of 
warfare.201 The time period following the Vietnam conflict is a good example of this. 
During the Vietnam irregular war, the U.S. armed forces captured lessons learned, 
established new procedures, and founded new programs focused on learning about 
irregular warfare. However, following the withdrawal from this conflict, each service 
purged itself of these lessons.202 Additionally, there was no direction for each military 
branch to maintain the ability to integrate SOF forces. While establishing SOCOM, to 
ensure Special Operations Forces are integrated has proven effective, each branch of the 
armed forces still has their own doctrine to govern activities, and outside of SOF each 
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military branch had difficulty operating jointly during the early years of the Afghan 
campaign. 
Finally, the Air Force did not have doctrine addressing irregular warfare of any 
nature prior to 2007, with the exception of a joint Field Manual published in 1990, much 
less a strategy to integrate technology in this type of conflict. Moreover, Air Force 
Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–3, dated 2007, did not use DOD or joint publications as a 
source for its definitions or methodologies covering irregular warfare. It was an air 
centric approach to irregular warfare, and technology integration, completely ignoring 
joint or combined operations. The Army was much the same way with its unified land 
operations doctrine published in 2011. This publication was more succinct with the joint 
publications than the Air Force; yet, it still had differing terminology and lacked direction 
for joint operations. More important, the definitions found in the joint publication were 
different, highlighting there was no clear comprehensive guidance across the different 
military branches.203 
D. TECHNOLOGY USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
In 2001, as the United States prepared to strike back at Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 
the Taliban controlled more than ninety percent of Afghanistan. The Taliban fighting 
strength was estimated at 45,000 troops. The Taliban weapon inventory included one 
hundred T-55 and T-62 tanks and other vehicles. They also had Soviet-made Katyusha 
rockets and some 80 armed helicopters. The Taliban did have some newer automatic 
rifles, machine guns, and mortars; additionally, intelligence suggested they may also have 
had some Scud short-range conventional ballistic missiles. Additional Taliban air assets 
included fewer than 50 MiG-21 and Su-22 fighter aircraft. Other intelligence reports 
hinted at an air defense network that included SA-3 SAM sites. Finally, their weapons 
inventory was assumed to include man-portable SA-7 infrared SAMs, anti-aircraft 
artillery (AAA) guns, and an undetermined number of U.S.-made Stinger shoulder-fired 
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infrared SAMs.204 Most of these weapons systems were left over from the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and their operational status was most likely degraded, and not 
well integrated. As the Taliban have continued to receive support from external actors, it 
is possible that other weapons technology has been available to them.205 
The United States military was limited to certain systems for multiple reasons. 
First, this was viewed as a limited war, and tailored toward terrorist organizations and 
those that support them. Additionally, Afghanistan is a land-locked country with harsh 
mountainous terrain. Mobility and agility influence weapons technology utilization 
within Afghanistan. Artillery is noticeably absent in the early stages of the conflict, and 
remains limited throughout the war.206 The United States military only employs four 
different artillery pieces throughout this campaign.207 Of these artillery pieces, there are 
two Howitzers, a 105mm and a 155mm. These Howitzers are the only gun-based artillery 
used by the United States. Mortar systems were also employed in Afghanistan to include 
the 60mm, and the 120mm. Artillery officers in the U.S. military do not consider mortars 
as part of artillery fires, however the 120mm mortar has been documented as an artillery 
replacement during this conflict, operated by artillery personnel. Therefore, it is be 
included in the technical analysis.208 Finally, the HIMARS rocket based unit was used 
with significant capabilities and accuracy compared to the gun based pieces; however, 
this depends on rock type used for employment.209 
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While the artillery and aircraft types were limited throughout this campaign, 
aircraft utilization was far less limited. Some sources have suggested over 30 types of 
military aircraft participated in the Afghanistan conflict.210 Additionally, there were 
multiple civilian agencies providing aircraft and personnel that were performing military 
type missions.211 All aircraft that did not operate from within Afghanistan, such as heavy 
bombers and tankers, are not considered during the technical analysis. These aircraft were 
not subjected to the same operational environment as the aircraft operating from within 
Afghanistan. These aircraft were at a safe operating altitude prior to entering the combat 
zone, plus maintenance and logistics were conducted in a non-combat environment. 
Additionally, the contract aircraft are not considered either. The military contracts 
specified the required capabilities and it was up to the provider to do the rest.  
Only considering military aircraft operations within Afghanistan, the United 
States military predominantly operated eighteen different types of aircraft throughout this 
war.212 Of these eighteen aircraft, the EC-130, EA-18G, EA-6B, MQ-1, and MC-12 are 
not included in the technical analysis. While they meet all the requirements listed above, 
their overall mission, and capabilities make it difficult to effectively analyze them in an 
unclassified environment. The remaining aircraft can quickly be divided into three 
different categories: lift, strike, and rotary-wing aircraft. Additionally, within each of 
these aircraft categories there are examples of low- to high-tech aircraft; however, some 
of their internal weapon systems may alter their overall technological sophistication. 
Furthermore, aircraft were operated by all branches of the U.S. military throughout the 
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war, and the aircraft technological level may have influence its ability to integrate into 
the overall campaign plan. 
1. Artillery Technology 
According to ADRP 3–09, field artillery is to defeat or disrupt enemy operations 
with integrated fires to enable successful maneuver commander operations.213 The U.S. 
Army has divided artillery into four broad categories based on gun size: 120mm and 
below is light artillery, 121–160mm is medium, 161–210mm is heavy, and 211mm and 
up it very heavy; however, these do not include MLRS systems that are categorized as 
medium- and long-range systems. Finally, a Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) or Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) may include one to five field artillery battalions, and each battalion 
may operate different artillery systems. An artillery battalion is generally around 200 
personnel, and has five to eight artillery pieces depending on their type.214 Within 
Afghanistan, towed artillery units were generally broke down to two gun units set up at 
FOBs, and larger units established at main operating bases.215 
Three of the four artillery pieces used in Afghanistan are towed units. Of these 
three artillery pieces, the M120 mortar is the only piece that breaks down small enough to 
maneuver on the battlefield without a tow vehicle. While it may be difficult for the five 
man team to maneuver fast and far with all their ammo, it is possible to quickly maneuver 
along offensive lines with a centralized ammunition location. The M120 is also the only 
smooth bore piece of artillery making it the least accurate, and has the shortest range. The 
M119A1 105mm Howitzer is the next smallest and lightest piece of artillery. This 
105mm Howitzer can be air transported with all its ammo by a UH60 helicopter or two 
can be carried by a Chinook helicopter. It is capable of shooting more than double the 
range of the M120, but well less than the M777. While its range is short of the M777, the 
M119A1 has a wider range of elevation capabilities, making it the only gun with a 
negative slop setting. Finally, the M777 was the largest caliber gun, with the longest 
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range of any of the towed pieces. And while the M777 fare outweighs the M119A1, it is 
almost half the weight of the M198 155mm Howitzer. Additionally, the M777 is the most 
accurate of all three towed pieces, but has the slowest rate of fire.216 Overall the M120 
mortar and M119A1 are low-tech, and the M777 is medium-tech. 
The M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) artillery piece is 
the only self-propelled artillery utilized by the United States in Afghanistan. The 
HIMARS entered service in 2005, but is quickly well integrated piece of artillery. The 
M142 is a lightweight wheeled version of the M270 MLRS unit that had been in service 
since the early 1980s. They share the same weapons systems, jut different maneuver 
chassis. The wheeled unit’s lighter weight makes in air lift able by an inter-theater 
aircraft like a C-130. Finally, the M142 offers general area bombardment with its smaller 
six missile ammo load, or pin point accuracy with the larger Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACM); however, to switch between the two missiles is excessively time 
consuming.217 The HIMARS artillery piece is high-tech during this conflict.  
2. Aircraft Technology 
The United States military tried to allocate air assets through mission 
requirements. Much like other countries, the U.S. military typically divides its aircraft by 
type: mobility, fighter, bomber, and ISR. Many of these aircraft have multi-role 
capabilities and do not fit into just one category; furthermore, there are mission 
requirements that are missing such as CAS and C2. Before examining the aircraft utilized 
by the U.S., it is important to understand how air assets are allocated. Most aircraft are 
control through the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). The CAOC controls 
allocation of aircraft for every military branch, and may include partner forces; thus, the 
CAOC is a joint, combined environment with its commander having the most air assets. 
The CAOC commander normally approves targeting lists, and allocates assets 
accordingly; however, this process was not followed holistically in OEF.218 For other 
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mission types, organizations typically submit a Joint Tactical Air Request (JTAR), and 
aircraft are allocated based on requirements; however, many request specific aircraft, and 
this may not be the best fit based on capabilities. Finally, there are multiple aircraft that 
the CAOC does not control, like the AC-130 and many rotary-wing aircraft throughout 
OEF. Many aircraft remain allocated to specific units for direct mission control. While 
this may benefit these units, it may also hinder other operations, and limit the CAOC 
effectiveness.219 Below is a comprehensive overview of each aircraft. For a complete 
capabilities review of each aircraft see Table 10 in Appendix B.  
Most rotary-wing assets are internal to various units to enable rapid reaction to 
mission requirements. Lift specific rotary-wing aircraft include CH-47s, UH-60s, and 
CV-22s. All of the aircraft can provide limited CAS if required. The CH-47 is the oldest 
of these aircraft, with the lowest max altitude, slowest max speed, and requires the largest 
amount of space to land; yet, it has the most lift capability, and mission duration when 
loaded. The CV-22 has the next highest lift capability, has the highest altitude capability, 
and highest max speed. However, they suffered from limited availability and extensive 
maintenance problems.220 The UH-60 carries the least, with the shortest flight duration; 
however, it has the second best altitude and speed capability, and requires the least 
amount of support. The UH-60 and CH-47 are considered low-tech, and the CV-22 is 
high-tech. Strike or CAS specific rotary-wing aircraft include AH-1s, OH-58s, and AH-
64s. The AH-1 has the highest altitude and speed capability, with the longest mission 
duration, and next best weapons load out. The AH-64 has the second best altitude, speed, 
and duration with the best weapons load capability. Finally, the OH-58 has the least 
altitude, speed, duration, and weapons load capability; however, it may offer the most 
mission flexibility. The OH-58 is low-tech, and the other two are medium- or high-tech 
depending on the variant. 
Most mobility or fixed-wing lift aircraft are allocated by the CAOC. These 
aircraft include C-130s, C-17s, and C-5s. The C-130 is mainly used for intra-theater 
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cargo movement, followed by the C-17; additionally, the C-130 offers the most mission 
flexibility with the least support requirements; additionally, it has extremely limited 
runway requirements. The C-17 is the newest aircraft, and is heavily automated. It is 
capable of flying higher, and has limited runway requirements. The C-5 requires the most 
support due to its complicated landing gear; however, it can lift the most, with the longest 
mission duration.221 The C-130 is low-tech, and the C-5 and C-17 are medium-tech 
aircraft. 
The remaining aircraft are fixed-wing strike or attack aircraft which include: A-
10s, F-16s, F-15Es, and AC-130s. Of these aircraft the AC-130 is the only one not 
controlled by the CAOC; additionally, has the longest flight duration, and can carry the 
most weapons load. However, until recently it did not have PGM capability, but is 
considered extremely accurate. The F-16 and F-15E are fast, with extreme altitude 
capability. Moreover, they potentially have the most mission flexibility depending on 
weapons load. However, both these aircraft have limited flight duration, require more 
ground support, and are airfield limited by runway conditions. The A-10 also benefits 
from high altitude capability, and relatively high speed; additionally it has the second best 
flight duration, and requires the least ground support. However, the A-10 is limited based 
on it weapons load, and sensor capabilities.222 The AC-130 and A-10 are medium-tech, 
and the F-16 and F-15E are high-tech aircraft.  
3. Military Operational Integration 
In 2002, Phase Three of the U.S. campaign plan begins with an extensive 
conventional force buildup. As discussed, prior to 2002 there were less than 2,000 U.S. 
personnel within Afghanistan; however, by the end of 2002 there are over 5,000.223 
Additionally, in March 2002, the U.S. launches it first large conventional military 
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operation in Afghanistan. Operation Anaconda set the stage for much of phase three 
operations. The ground force conducted this operation without its normal artillery 
support; yet, they did have artillery personnel operating integrated mortar fires 
throughout the operation. While the mortar system mobility proved effective during this 
operation, its range limitations proved problematic. Air support was used as a gap fill for 
the ground force throughout this operation, and would remain a staple for all future 
operations.224 Unfortunately, the ground force did not include the COAC in planning for 
this operation, and the air components were only included at the last minute.225 
AH-64 attack helicopters and AC-130s were the primary CAS platforms during 
Operation Anaconda. A-10 aircraft participated, but on a limited bases as they had just 
arrived in theater.226 Other assets were used for shaping operations, but they were very 
ineffective due to poor planning integration. Additionally, friendly fire incidents became 
problematic, for various reasons, for both fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets.227 Altitude 
and time on station was problematic for the AH-64, but this was compensated for with 
larger fleet support. Additionally, AC-130s were able to fill support gaps through 
extending there on target time.228 The additional gunship support was also possible 
because of number of aircraft availability. There were three times more gunships for CAS 
support throughout phase two and three as compared to phase four.229 However, the 
gunship support was also limited due to operating restrictions that remained unchanged 
till 2012.230 Finally, the COAC was able to redirect multiple aircraft in the area of 
responsibility (AOR) as emergency CAS was requested, and F-15Es and F-16s were able 
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to quickly react to provide support.231 Throughout the remainder of this operation the 
COAC was reactionary, and used multiple aircraft for support due the poor planning 
integration. 
Using the lessons learned from Operation Anaconda, rotary-wing and SOF 
specific aircraft became the primary air support for ground operations during phase three. 
This is most likely because these aircraft were internal to those forces operating on the 
ground, meaning the ground force commander always had control and not the CAOC.232 
Additionally, ground operations generally included SOF for various reasons and with that 
came there direct air support units. The AH-64 attack helicopter was the primary rotary-
wing systems for CAS during this time, and AC-130s were the primary fixed wing 
aircraft. The COAC still assigned a variety of aircraft for ground support, but they 
remained poorly integrated. Rotary-wing assets proved to be very effective for smaller 
operations during this time, however, their limited fight duration continued to be 
problematic. Additionally, reaching higher altitude locations was not possible during the 
summer months due to air density issues, and winter flight operations were limited due to 
severe weather conditions.  
The U.S. continued to increase its overall force structure within Afghanistan and 
by the end of Phase Three in the summer of 2003 there were over 10,000 personnel in 
Afghanistan.233 With the increased force structure, the ground component is able to 
establish more FOBs, and artillery starts flowing into Afghanistan.234 The 105mm and 
155mm artillery pieces start flowing into Afghanistan. These FOBs serve as a location 
where artillery can support all ground maneuver operations that have proven problematic 
to air assets.235 Artillery units are far more integrated into ground operations, especially 
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in the planning phase, and this enables these units to rapidly react during combat 
operations as compared to air support units. Additionally, artillery can operate during 
weather conditions that will prevent effective air support and at altitudes where rotary-
wing assets have difficulty operating. This ensures continuous fires during all operations. 
However, there are some sever limitations.  
Mobility remained problematic for artillery, it limits their movement and 
effectiveness; additionally, accuracy becomes an issue at max ranges.236 Thus, most 
operations included air support, or had a quick reaction air asset assigned to it. This 
further complicated the environment for artillery units as they were not generally well 
integrated with air assets or with each other.237 Without detailed integration with air 
assets artillery fire may go through the altitude aircraft are operating, and this results in 
aircraft standing off from the target environment when artillery is active. Furthermore, 
artillery units are organized to integrate with a larger artillery system for effective fires; 
however, in Afghanistan artillery employment typically only included a couple guns and 
mortars, as compared to multiple artillery pieces staggered by size and range.238 
In the summer of 2003, the U.S. campaign moved into Phase Four and NATO 
takes the helm in Afghanistan as the U.S. shifts multiple assets to Iraq.239 This does not 
mean the U.S. reduced its strength in Afghanistan, on the contrary the number of U.S. 
personnel continued to grow every year through 2011.240 However, the SOF and air 
assets were split between Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, SOF organizations were not 
well integrated with the growing number of conventional forces. This limited gunship 
availability within Afghanistan, and from this point forward they only supported SOF. 
Additionally, the growing conventional force was forced to rely on the CAOC to provide 
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air support. The CAOC fills these growing support requests with what was available and 
for Afghanistan that meant A-10s, F-16s, F-15Es and B-1B aircraft. Of these aircraft, the 
technical analysis clearly indicates the A-10 as the best platform; however, it only 
provides nineteen percent of CAS support throughout this phase.241 In fact, the F-16 
provided nearly double the amount of CAS support, and the F-15E provided nearly the 
same amount of support as the A-10.242  
Prior to entering Phase Four, the CAOC, SOF organizations, and conventional 
forces managed to find an effective right-tech solution with air assets. Additionally, with 
overall operational integration the artillery units were slowly taking shape. As the 
political and military priorities shift to Iraq, this is no longer the case. The statistical data 
above was from 2006 to 2013, further highlighting this as a phase four failure to find a 
right-tech solution.243 Phase three had many more gunships, and quickly introduced A-
10s into the AOR. The F-15E was also operating internal to Afghanistan during phase 
three and four, but the A-10 units oversaw operations during phase three. During phase 
four this shifts to F-15Es as they made up one third of the CAS asset available from the 
CAOC, highlighting the deviation from a right-tech solution. Furthermore, air assets 
throughout phase four continued to be reactionary, and poorly integrated as the CAOC 
tried to manage two different AORs. This finally changes with the F-15E withdrawal 
from Afghanistan at the end of 2012. The A-10 takes center stage with the CAOC 
internal to Afghanistan, and they start to re-integrate with ground users now that air 
support is becoming more limited.244  
During Phase Four of operations new artillery is introduced. The U.S. military 
deploys the M777 155mm, and HIMARS rocket based artillery during this time. The 
M777, as mentioned earlier, is much lighter and slightly more accurate than the M198 
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gun it replaced. Additionally, the two guns shared the same ammunition, so no new 
supply requirements manifested from this artillery shift. What is significant is the ability 
to air lift the lighter M777 plus more ammunition with rotary-wing assets. As mission 
priorities shift, these artillery units are better suited compared to its predecessor.245 The 
HIMARS artillery system brings a whole new artillery capability to Afghanistan during 
this time. This was the only rocket based system utilized in Afghanistan by the U.S.; 
additionally, it was the only one that offered precision munitions at the time.246 However, 
the weapons system was new to the operators, and was not well integrated. It was even 
suggested that the Air Force’s ability to support ground operations negated having the 
HIMARS artillery in Afghanistan.247 Finally, the HIMARS does not offer close in 
support like the gun based artillery. While the HIMARS long range capability enables a 
great standoff capability, it stands to reason it cannot be used for self-defense missions. 
In 2012, the military starts to shift back to a SOF centric strategy.248 For this 
analysis, the strategy of SOF vice conventional is of little importance; what is important 
is the balance of force and technology. With SOF unit numbers increasing, and 
conventional forces decreasing, complete force integration reemerges. From an air asset 
and technology perspective, the Air Force is able to return to a right-tech solution with 
the A-10s taking center stage for the CAOC, and gunships increasing with the increased 
SOF presence. Additionally, over this long war the gunship and A-10 fleets have been 
modified to include precision munitions, and better fire control systems.249 These 
modifications have enabled these platforms to better integrate with the military campaign 
planes, further highlighting them as a right-tech solution. Other platforms also see 
significant modifications to increase operational capability. A good example of this is the 
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newest AH-64E. It has upgraded engines and rotor blades that enable the attack 
helicopter to have a quicker response time and longer time-on-target capability.250 
Another example is the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) for the gun based artillery shells. 
The PGK for both Howitzers used in this conflict enable accuracy within ten meters at all 
possible ranges.251 
Finally, in 2014 the U.S. announces the end of the war in Afghanistan, concluding 
phase four operations. This does not mean all U.S. troops have left Afghanistan. What is 
does appear to mean is the U.S. is shifting to a SOF centric approach, which will assist 
the Afghan military units through training and other various activities.252 The specifics 
for this shift in operations are still unclear, but the U.S. military continues to field various 
technologies it views will help keep Afghanistan stable. 
E. TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION EVALUATION 
The U.S. military was operating in a resource limited environment, in a harsh 
mountainous region, against an irregular force with substantial external support. 
Additionally, in 2001, the U.S. military was not well prepared for an irregular war, as 
they had limited doctrinal guidance on irregular warfare. Due to overwhelming pressure 
from the White House, the military, with CIA assistance, was able to quickly respond 
following the September attack in 2001. The initial response appeared to be conventional 
with an Air Force standardized approach to removing any air defense capability. This was 
one of the primary missions for the Air Force, and they quickly eliminated this threat 
through overwhelming force. 
The operations in Afghanistan quickly became SOF centric with CIA assistance. 
SOF teams were able to enlist help from the Northern Alliance, and started calling in air 
strikes on dynamic targets. Additionally, SOF centric air assets started operating 
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autonomously throughout the AOR, and effectively eliminated targets of opportunity. 
From 2002 through 2003, SOF and conventional forces are able to integrate effectively, 
and find a right-tech solution.  
Unfortunately, when the United States shifted priorities to Iraq, much of the 
success in Afghanistan started to disintegrate. The right-tech solution was lost through 
shifting priorities and not following established support requests. Air support becomes 
reactive instead of proactive. While artillery starts to take shape during this time, it never 
fully integrates with the supported users. They are able to find a right-tech solution within 
the mountainous battle space; however, this is only true when there is no integrated air 
support. Artillery almost became a substitute for air support when weather or 
environmental conditions prevented air support. What really proves effective is the 
mortar systems used by artillery personnel with integrated air support. However, artillery 
personnel do not consider mortar systems artillery, and never really seek to develop this 
successful integration into a standard operating procedure. 
Following the United States reprioritization in Afghanistan, air support may once 
again be able to find a right-tech solution. Additionally, many technologies that have had 
difficulties operating in this environment have been modified to make them better suited 
for these operational conditions. The U.S. military clearly has an effective weapons 
technology program to update existing integrated weapons systems. Some of these 
changes are quicker than others, most likely because they are utilizing off the shelf 
technology. In other words, no new technology has been developed. The modified A-10, 
AH-64E and light weight artillery are good examples of modified technology; however, it 
has not been a rapid process. New technologies, like the PGK, have been slow because of 
development issues. Ultimately, over the fourteen year war, the U.S. military is able to 
find a right-tech solution, twice. Unfortunately, the U.S. military is unaware of their 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91
VI. CONCLUSION 
During the course of this thesis, the literature review showed there are multiple 
theories about technology utilization in conventional warfare, but a gap exists in theories 
about technology in irregular warfare. The three case studies suggest that these 
technologically-developed militaries were each able to appropriately respond to 
conventional threats with the correct weapons technology. All three powers faced some 
form of conventional threat during their conflicts, and were able to dominate that portion 
of the campaign. However, in each conflict, the irregular actors remain problematic for 
all three technologically developed militaries. Furthermore, there are examples of all 
three strong actors trying to overwhelm their enemy with technological superiority, and 
ultimately operating inefficiently as they did not utilize technology based on capability. 
Additionally, the technology that was non-capability driven provided the enemy with 
exploitable gaps in technology, and reduced the strong actor’s asymmetric advantage. 
The technology evaluation for each case study has identified three overarching 
issues with technology utilization in irregular warfare: failure to identify requirements, 
poor technology integration, and poor technology modification processes. First, it is 
essential for commanders to identify required capabilities based on environmental 
conditions and objectives in irregular warfare. Unfortunately, this is not how developed 
militaries typically engage an irregular enemy, and ultimately waste resources. Once the 
best weapons technologies have been identified tactical and technological innovation 
were generally able to fill any capability gap. However, this is only true with medium- 
and low-tech weapons systems. Medium- and low-tech weapons systems are generally 
better integrated into the force structure, and this enables the tactical and technological 
adjustments for operational gaps. Finally, in order for tactical and technological 
innovations to be successful, there must be an established process to produce the required 
changes in a timely manner to eliminate any capability gap. Tactical changes will need to 
be addressed through tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) analysis, and technology 
innovation should be addressed through a rapid acquisition program for off-the-shelf-
technology. Addressing these short falls in doctrine, resource allocation processes, 
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tactical innovation analysis processes, and acquisition processes will enable an effective 
irregular warfare technology strategy. 
A. CHANGES TO DOCTRINE 
To enable a successful technology strategy in irregular warfare, it must be 
addressed in the military doctrine. The U.S. Air Force doctrine is the only irregular 
warfare doctrine of all American military thought to highlight the shortcomings of 
technology strategy in this type of conflict, and this provides a foundation to build on. 
AFDD 3–2 goes on to say “Both high and low technology assets have applicability in IW. 
Commanders should understand the appropriate technology to apply to the specific 
operational or tactical problem.”253 However, this guidance is poorly placed, and hard to 
interpret. It does not address the true problem, a lack of technology integration strategy. 
This should be modified to include all technology, and needs to direct commander to act 
based on needed capabilities. The Air Force has already assumed commanders are 
familiar with specific technology capabilities, but fails to direct them to follow a 
capability based approach. I would recommend changing this verbiage to read:  
All technology assets have applicability in IW based on required capabilities. 
Commanders need to outline required capabilities based on specific operational 
and tactical problems. These capabilities will be priorities and used to identify the 
appropriate weapons technology for operational integration. Finally, commanders 
need to identify any remaining capability gaps based on technology resources 
provided. 
This guidance gives commanders clear direction to enable effective technology 
utilization; yet, it will also give them the flexibility to determine the process for 
implementation. At a minimum, this direction needs to be included in JP 1, AFDD 3–2, 
and ADRP 3–0 to ensure the entire DOD develops a sound technology strategy in 
irregular warfare. Additionally, this is not an all-inclusive list of doctrinal manuals that 
should contain this information; it represents a foundation so each service can adjust 
based on the changing technological resources and the operational environment. 
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Additionally, for a technology strategy to be effective, each military organization 
needs clear concise irregular warfare guidance or doctrine. The Navy continues to play a 
critical role in irregular warfare; however, they do not have an irregular warfare doctrine. 
The most resent guidance the Navy offers is their Irregular warfare vision statement from 
2010, and it is extremely misaligned with joint irregular warfare doctrine.254 
Additionally, the Air Force and Army irregular warfare doctrine, while better aligned 
with the joint publication, does not commanders clear guidance. Much of the terminology 
is vague leaving operational commanders guessing at the true operational intent. JP 3–05, 
and its associated annexes, is much better at identifying mission roles and expectation for 
irregular warfare. This doctrine is specific to special operations; yet, offers each of the 
services an example of clear irregular warfare doctrine.  
B. CHANGES IN PROCESSES 
There are three processes that need further consideration to enable a successful 
technology strategy that is built on doctrinal guidance. Organization need to develop a 
capabilities-based approach to allocate resources. Once resources have been allocated and 
employed in the operational environment, operators will discover system or operating 
limitation that will inhibit their capability or effectiveness. Some of these limitations may 
be addressed by changing operating procedures, or tactics. However, the case studies 
have shown that changing tactics may lead to more accidents and maintenance, as was 
the case with the Hind. Thus, it is important to develop a process to test new tactics to 
ensure they are safe, and to include them in normal training operations. Finally, operators 
and commanders will discover operating limitations that can only be addressed through 
technology. For example, the operating environment might affect radio communications, 
and a better radio might fix the problem. This fix requires technology modification, and 
faster is better for the combat environment is constantly changing. 
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1. Change in Resource Allocation Processes 
Each military branch needs to develop a capabilities-based process for operational 
support from external units or organizations. While some of the current support request 
processes consider capability, it also allows for commanders to request specific weapons 
systems. This should only be authorized when operational integration is dependent on a 
specific technology. Additionally, the current process is inefficient and creates 
vulnerabilities through technology mismanagement leading to gaps in operational 
capabilities. The attached appendices provide an example of a capabilities-based process; 
however, they are limited in nature. The process used for this thesis is based on resources 
that have already been provided to combat commanders, and would be available to 
forward operating organization such as the CAOC to manage. The request process needs 
to move beyond this type of technology management. These organizations should have 
resources to allocate based on previously identified required capabilities, and they need 
the ability to rapidly acquire any additional resources that will remove an operational gap 
based on overall capability. Finally, this process should also allow combat commanders 
to identify resources that are no longer needed based on environmental or operational 
changes to expedite their re-deployment back to home station. To facilitate this process, 
combat commanders need access to a capabilities matrix maintained by each military 
organization. This will help combat commanders quickly identify required resources, and 
identify any gaps in capability.255 
2. Change in Tactical Analysis Processes 
Each case study has examples of tactical innovation to overcome weapons 
technology limitations, and the British and U.S. militaries have examples of weapons 
technology modification based on the capability limitations that led to innovation. More 
importantly, weapons technology that is not modified following a tactical change tends to 
have a shorter life cycle, ultimately limiting availability and increasing cost. The shorter 
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life cycle is due to increased wear on the weapon system, increase operational risk 
leading to accidents, or both. Having a tactical analysis program identifies these new 
vulnerabilities based on the new tactics, and ensures complete weapons technology 
integration. 
The Air Force has a tactics program, that begins at the unit level, operating 
through each major command, and finally culminates with complete force integration. 
This program functions through a tactics unit within every air wing, and through the 
weapons school attached to every major command.256 Tactics units take inputs form all 
operational units within their wing, and work to integrate new tactics quarterly. The 
Weapon School maintains responsibility for training operators to be experts in their 
weapons systems. Additionally, the Weapons School and tactics units work together for 
major tactical changes to operating procedures, and integrate these changes with all major 
commands. Finally, the major command operational office over sees the entire program, 
and integrates it with major command testing units. These testing units ensure the 
weapons systems are not operating under conditions that will cause system failure. If the 
test unit identifies possible issues, potential weapon system modifications are highlighted. 
Of the armed forces, this program appears to be the most effective as the Air Force major 
commands have mission overlap. The other services tend to divide areas of responsibility 
due to mobility restrictions, and do not effectively integrate in this manner. This can 
serve as a foundation for the other services.  
While this tactics integration system is effective, it does have some limitations 
under its current construct. First, large major commands have overly complex process 
due to geographic separation, and weapons systems diversity. Second, there are too many 
internal agency integration requirements for tactics to be officially changed. If the 
process is too cumbersome, operators may start performing tactics without following the 
established process. This was the case for the Soviet military in Afghanistan, and that is 
why there were so many accidents. The agencies required for an expedited tactics 
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integration program are those listed above; however, this does not represent all the 
extraneous units or agencies that are involved in this process. Each command needs to 
evaluate their processes, and remove steps that will facilitate tactics innovation while 
maintaining system and operator safety.257 At least one command has put time limitations 
on the process for a tactical change or recommendation to go through the complete 
process, and eliminates many internal agencies based on requirements.258 This enables 
any operator or commander to quickly determine the amount of time for recommended 
changes. This needs to be the standard across the military services. 
3. Change in the Acquisitions Processes 
All three case studies provide examples of technology modification through a 
process that made fielded weapons systems more capable, or a failure to modify weapons 
technology leaving a gap in capability. Additionally, it appears that the more advanced 
systems take longer to modify. For example, the British were able to modify aircraft with 
previously developed camera and communication systems in just a few months; yet, the 
U.S. military appears to need between five to ten years to modify its weapons technology. 
The Soviets simply used its weapons technology to failure and replaced it. Both the 
Soviet and the U.S. process of adjusting technology on the battlefield left them 
vulnerable to capability gaps, and it most likely increased the overall cost of the conflict. 
In 2009, the Defense Science Board report to the Secretary of Defense states the 
“DOD lacks the ability to rapidly field new capabilities for the warfighter.”259 
Additionally, the attached memorandum says “[t]he report cites a number of institutional 
barriers to rapid fielding of proven technologies.”260 In other words, six years ago the 
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Secretary of defense was given a report stating the acquisition program was broken, and 
out lined steps to fix the problem. These steps included using proven technology, 
suggesting the use of medium and low level technologies, and a new rapid acquisition 
process that would operate independent of the current acquisition process. The report 
clearly highlights the benefits of the current process for new developing high-tech 
weapons systems, and suggests there are many lower level proven technologies that can 
be rapidly fielded to modify existing weapon systems to increase their overall capability.  
To date, SOCOM is the only organization to implement a rapid acquisition 
program.261 SOCOM started their rapid acquisition process shortly after the above report 
was published. Their process has proven so effective that new equipment has been fielded 
in under seven days, Unmanned Air Vehicles have been fielded in fourteen weeks, and a 
new weapons system was fielded in under six months.262 SOCOM Directive 70–1 
outlines their acquisition program and process, and it follows the suggested methodology 
from the above report. This is a proven process that can be tailored by each military 
service to establish a rapid acquisition process. This process has the ability to enable new 
warfighting capabilities based on low and medium technologies, and their rapid fielding 
programs. 
C. SUMMARY 
This study has examined the use of technology in irregular warfare to help 
understand the strategic benefits offered by most levels of technology. In reviewing 
existing theories of technology in warfare, there is clearly a gap regarding technology 
strategy in irregular warfare. Additionally, some scholars believe environmental 
conditions of a given situation may lead to the misapplication of technology, and their 
analysis of the environment is based on simplicity and stability.263 By understanding the 
difference between a simple and complex environment—and a stable and unstable 
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environment—it is possible to determine the correct level of technology that could enable 
success in irregular warfare. 
This research has focused on identifying the proper use of technology in irregular 
warfare by examining the impacts of doctrine and on-the-ground decisions related to the 
use of technology. Accompanying the case study approach, an in-depth technical 
examination of artillery and aircraft utilized during each conflict studied offers insights 
into how technology influenced the decision to employ certain equipment over others to 
counter irregular opponents. In short, this studied attempted to identify where the strong 
actor went awry in its use of technology during an irregular warfare campaign, and 
recommend technological strategy changes that may close the gap in needed operational 
capability. Through implementing the changes to doctrine and a variety of processes 
outlined in this chapter, military leaders can develop an effective technology strategy for 
waging irregular warfare. Moreover, if these changes are adapted, fewer resources will be 
needed, less risk will be assumed, and overall capability will increase. 
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APPENDIX A. ARTILLERY 
A. THE MISSION IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Joint Publication (JP) 1 defines irregular warfare, and JP 3–0 governs joint 
operations. JP 3–05 governs all special operations through SOCOM with annexes for 
each military branch components, and it further expands on missions associated with 
irregular warfare.264 Additionally, the Air Force and Army service specific doctrine sites 
JP 1, JP 3–0, and JP 3–05 for much of its information and definitions governing 
operations in irregular warfare. Finally, Army component commanders and staff can refer 
to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–0, and ADRP 3–05 for guidance in 
irregular warfare. As the focus of this thesis is technology in irregular warfare, the 
mission set listed below was used for making assumptions, and listing mission priorities. 
Each commander has the ability to shape these priorities as the mission and environment 
changes to enable a right-tech solution.  
ADRP 3–05 summarizes the role SOCOM plays in irregular warfare, and 
differentiates U.S. Army responsibilities from U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC) responsibilities. Additionally, ADRP 3–05 outlines all mission sets that may 
be applicable in irregular warfare that are found in national law or title 10, DOD 
Directives, SOCOM publications, and Joint Doctrine.265 Finally, Field Manual (FM) 3–
05 differentiates between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation. At the 
tactical level, FM 3–05 outlines responsibilities based on offense, defense, and stability 
actions.266 These mission sets were the primary factors when considering artillery in 
irregular warfare. Moreover, FM 3–05 directs all U.S. Army personnel to follow this 
manual and mission sets in irregular warfare; thus, this may be transferred to 
conventional units, not just Special Operations Forces. Finally, FM 3–0 utilizes the same 
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offensive, defensive, and stability operations organization as FM 3–05 with some of the 
same information in irregular warfare; however, it does not fully explore the irregular 
warfare mission set like that found in FM 3–05.267  
It is up to the overall campaign commander and ground component commander to 
outline the requirements for artillery assets based on the mission and environment. After 
consulting this doctrine and several experts in this field at the command level, one way to 
outline these requirements is through stacking priorities. As an example, a commander 
may develop priorities based on missions such as shaping, defensive, and offensive. Once 
missions are decided on, the commander and staff will stack priorities based on 
capability. For the shaping category, an example of stacked priorities might include 
deliver a high volume of ammunition, followed by coordinated fires, long range, very 
mobile, and finally require little maintenance. Once completed the raw data is 
mathematically weighted by the commanders stacked priorities.  
Prior to weighting the commander’s priorities, it is necessary to categorize or bin 
each artillery capability for comparison and analysis. Each case study has a table that 
highlights specific capabilities for each piece of artillery that was available for use. This 
data has been divided into three main categories for overall ranking to include mission 
flexibility, operational environment, and required support. The mission flexibility 
category shows the adaptability of a weapons technology on the battlefield as the mission 
changes. Artillery with multiple ammunition types, designed for different targets, have 
adaptability; thus, the more ammunition types an artillery piece has the more flexible it is. 
These ammunition types make up the sub-categories for mission flexibility. The 
operational environment involves the terrain, the weather conditions, and the tactical 
operations of opposing forces. Terrain and weather are re problematic in this thesis due to 
extrema elevation changes in the mountains, cold weather, and the state boards. Tactical 
operations of opposing forces are either conventional of irregular, and this thesis focuses 
on irregular. The sub-categories are technical details for each artillery weapons system 
effecting its capability in the operational environment: range, elevation, rate of fire, 
                                                 
267 United States Army. Operations (FM 3–0) (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2008), 
chapters 1 and 2. 
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weight for mobility, and miss distances. Required support and capability refers to number 
of operators, maintainers, and overall reliability of the weapons systems. 
Many of the sub-categories can be directly transferred to the commander’s 
priority tables like the rate of fire; however, some of the priorities must use multiple sub-
categories to form the weapons systems ranking. An example of this is flexibility. The 
commander priority list has flexibility as a requirement, but this is not a listed capability 
like range or rate of fire. Therefore, multiple sub-categories must be combined to form a 
flexibility score. In this example all the ammo types available formed the flexibility 
composite score. Furthermore, if multiple artillery pieces share the same composite score 
based on ammo type, then gun degrees of elevation and traverse capability is factored 
into the overall score. Finally, many sub-categories listed in the raw data tables use a 
number system between zero and one to define capability. Zero or N/A means that 
weapons technology does not have the capability for that sub-category; one means it is 
fully capable, and number score in between one and zero is partially capable.268 
Once all priorities are established, all available artillery pieces are determined, 
and all artillery capabilities are outlined for comparison, the raw data can be populated 
based on ranking.269 For example, the raw data suggests the QF 18-Pounder Gun has the 
highest volume or rate of fire, and the BL 60-Pounder Gun has the lowest volume or rate 
of fire; therefore, the QF 18-Pounder Gun is ranked number 1 of 6, and the BL 60-
Pounder Gun is number 6 of 6.270 All remaining artillery pieces are ranked somewhere in 
between. Additionally, the stacked commander priorities are given a score to enable the 
waiting process. The highest priority is given a score of 1, and the lowest priority 
receives a score of 5 since that is all the listed priorities for this example. Once this is 
complete, a weighted score is developed by multiplying the artillery ranking scores by the 
score value assigned by the commanders’ priorities and added up. The formula for 
weighting each capability is as follows: (required capability*commander priority 
                                                 
268 Tables 1, 3, and 5 contain the raw data outlined in this paragraph. Table 1 is the British case study, 
Table 3 is the Soviet case study, and Table 5 is the U.S. case study raw data for each artillery piece. 
269 See the upper right corner of Table 2, Table 4, and Table 6 for commander priorities for each case 
study. For this paper, each table shares the same commander priorities. Additionally, there is a table for 
each case study with the basic capabilities of each piece of artillery, or the raw data. 
270 See Table 1 for rate of fire, and Table 2 for ranking based on rate of fire. 
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ranking). Once each capability is multiplied by the commander’s priority ranking, all five 
scores are added up for their total score for final ranking. 
For example, the QF 13-Pounder Gun, in the Third Anglo-Afghan War case 
study, has three different scores based on mission: 41 for shaping operations, 54 for 
defensive operations, and 51 for offensive operations.271 Using the formula outlined 
above, the QF 13-Pounder Gun shaping formula is: (volume*priority 1) + (FDC*priority 
2) + (ranger*priority 3) + (range*priority 4) + (reliability*priority 5) = score.272 In 
number form this looks like (2*1) + (3*2) + (5*3) + (2*4) + (2*5) = 41. Once each 
artillery piece has been weighted based on commander’s priorities, each artillery piece is 
ranked where the best artillery gets the lowest score and the worst gets the highest score. 
The QF 13-Pounder Gun score of 41 is second best as the QF 18-Pounder Gun has a 
better shaping score.273 This process is repeated for the other two missions based on 
commander’s priorities. 
Finally, several assumptions have been stipulated for the culmination of this data. 
First, the artillery environment focuses on conditions important to Afghanistan, the 
eastern frontier, and the difficulty of maneuvering in the region. Additionally, the 
mountainous terrain effected setup and resupply conditions in addition to mobility. 
Second, ammunition enables artillery adaptability. The more ammunition types available 
to a piece of artillery, the more adaptable it is to mission variation. Third, the degrees of 
elevation change for a piece of artillery is essential in this environment. A larger degree 
of elevation change results in a more capable artillery piece. Additionally, negative 
degrees of depression, to shoot down mountain ridge, also results in a more capable 
artillery piece. Forth, increased mobility reduces the time for artillery setup. This also 
enables faster repositioning during quick military advances. Fifth, the more crew 
members required to operate a piece of artillery, the more complex and vulnerable the 
piece of artillery is. Sixth, all systems have effective fire direction control (FDC) centers 
                                                 
271 These scores are found in the lower left corner of Table 2, Table 4, and Table 6. 
272 The numbers for priority population are found in the middle of Table 2, Table 4, and Table 6. The 
priorities are outlined in the upper right corner of the same tables. 
273 Overall mission ranking for each artillery piece is found in the upper left corner of Table 2, Table 
4, and Table 6. 
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to lay the line, calculate the elevation and deflection, and coordinate fires.274 Finally, 
crew members may be interchangeable in the Thirds Anglo-Afghan War, meaning the 
loss of one crew member will not shut down the gun; however, this changes as the 
artillery becomes more modern, and crew members are not interchangeable in the other 
two cases. Finally, mechanization changed drastically of time. All artillery utilized in the 
Soviet and in the U.S. cases required mechanization, those requiring smaller vehicles are 
more adaptive. However, tracked units may be less affected by environmental conditions. 
B. ARTILLERY SPECIFICATIONS FROM THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 
Table 1.   Detailed Information for the Artillery the British Empire Utilized 
in the Third Afghan-Anglo War 
 
Adapted from: Dale Clarke, British Artillery 1914–19: Field Army Artillery. Vol. 94. 




                                                 
274 Each table contains weighted data for analysis using the FDC abbreviation for coordinated fires 
under commander priorities. Additionally, there are nine capabilities listed out in the middle of the table 
due to differing commander priorities for shaping, offensive, and defensive missions. 
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Table 2.   Weighted Artillery Capabilities Based on Commander’s Priorities 
That May Have Existed during the Third Anglo-Afghan War 
 
 
Based on the weighted data, the QF 18-Pounder Gun would be the best shaping 
artillery with a score of 32, the QF 3.7 Howitzer would be the best defensive artillery 
with a score of 25, and the QF 18-Pounder Gun would be the best offensive artillery 
piece with a score of 32. These scores are derived from commander priorities, the 
operating environment, and the weapon systems capability. Therefore, of the available 
artillery, these two artillery pieces represent a right-tech solution based on flexibility, 
environment, support and capability, and the proposed commander priorities for this 




C. ARTILLERY SPECIFICATIONS: THE SOVIET UNION AFGHANISTAN 
INVASION 
Table 3.   Detailed Information for All the Artillery the Soviet Union 
Utilized in This War 
 
Adapted from: Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1984–85. Hull, Markov, and Zaloga, 
Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design Practices: 1945 to Present. Genys, 2S9 Nona-











Table 4.   Weighted Artillery Capabilities Based on Commander’s Priorities 
That May Have Existed during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
 
 
Based on the weighted data, the BM-21 MRLS would be the best shaping and 
offensive artillery piece with scores of 49 and 62 respectively, and the 2B9 Vasilek 
would be the best defensive artillery piece with a score of 45.275 These scores are derived 
from commander priorities, the operating environment, and the weapon systems 
capability. Therefore, of the available artillery, these two artillery pieces represent a 
right-tech solution based on flexibility, environment, support and capability, and the 
proposed commander priorities for this conflict. 
 
                                                 
275 The shaping score for the BM-21 and BM-27 are the same, I chose the BM-21 due to its higher 
missile load out and reliability compared to the BM-27. 
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D. ARTILLERY SPECIFICATIONS: UNITED STATES AFGHANISTAN 
CONFLICT 
Table 5.   Detailed Information for All the Artillery the United States 
Utilized in Afghanistan during the War on Terror 
 
Adapted from: Christopher Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery, Vol. 23. Federation of 
American Scientists; FAS Military Analysis Network U.S. Land Warfare Systems. 
Table 6.   Weighted Artillery Capabilities Based on Commander’s Priorities 
That May Have Existed During the United States Afghan Conflict 
 
 
Based on the weighted data, the M119 Howitzer would be the best shaping and 
defensive artillery piece with scores of 31 respectively, and M120 mortar would be the best 
 108
offensive artillery piece. These scores are derived from commander priorities, the operating 
environment, and the weapon systems capability. Therefore, of the available artillery, these 
two artillery pieces represent a right-tech solution based on flexibility, environment, 
support and capability, and the proposed commander priorities for this conflict. They 
represent the most capable artillery available for these three missions. 
 109
APPENDIX B. AIRCRAFT 
A. THE MISSION IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
For a complete understanding of the military mission in irregular warfare refer to 
Appendix for the complete doctrine review.276 The doctrine review in this Appendix is 
limited to airpower. The AFSOF annex includes the core mission sets that further define 
air operations in irregular warfare.277 The AFSOF annex explains each of these core 
functions and highlights the AFSOF contribution to these activities. This ensures each 
Air Force major command remains focused on their role for irregular warfare, and the 
core mission set that goes with it. In other words, the AFSOF annex addresses more than 
just SOF air assets; it defines the role for conventional forces as well. For example, 
mobility command is responsible for large scale movements and the logistics that goes 
with it, while AFSOC remains focused on special unit intel, strike, and light mobility. 
This enables each of those commands to focus on technology relevant to its core mission 
set, but does not suggest the level of technology that should be used.278 JP 1, JP 3–0, and 
JP 3–05 all suggest that every U.S. military unit needs to be trained and equipped for the 
missions listed under irregular warfare. Therefore, the mission priorities and assumptions 
listed below are applicable to all U.S. military units, and may be tailored based on 
commanders needs to fill the gap left in the doctrine. 
Now it is up to the overall campaign commander and air component commander 
to outline the requirements for aircraft assets based on the mission and environment. 
After consulting this doctrine and several experts in this field at the command level, one 
way to outline these requirements is through stacking priorities. As an example, a 
commander may develop priorities based on missions such as look, lift, and strike 
capabilities. Once missions are decided on, the commander and staff will stack priorities 
                                                 
276 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–05, Special Operations. Washington, DC: 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. July 16, 2014. United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 
3-2, Irregular Warfare. Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 2013), 5. 
277 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3–30, Command and 
Control of Air Operations. Washington, DC: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. February 10, 2014. 
278 Ibid.  
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based on capability. For the strike category an example of stacked priorities might 
include accuracy, followed by air and ground capable, day and night operations, long 
loiter time, and finally low required support. Once this has been completed the raw data 
is mathematically weighted by the commanders stacked priorities. 
Once all the priorities have been established, and all available aircraft have been 
outlined, the raw data can be populated based on ranking.279 For example, the raw data 
suggests the Handley Page 1500 has the longest flight duration, and the Bristol Fighter 
has the shortest flight duration; therefore, the Handley Page 1500 is ranked number 1 of 
6, and the Bristol Fighter is number 6 of 6.280 All remaining aircraft are ranked 
somewhere in between. Additionally, the stacked commander priorities are given a 
number value as well to enable the waiting process. The highest priority is given a value 
of 1, and the lowest priority receives a value of 5 since that is all the listed priorities for 
this example. Once this is complete, simply multiply the aircraft ranking number by the 
number value assigned to the commanders priorities and add them up. The formula for 
weighting each capability is as follows: (required capability*commander priority 
ranking). Once each capability is multiplied by the commander’s priority ranking, all five 
scores are added up for their total score for final ranking. 
For example, the Bristol Fighter, in the Third Anglo-Afghan War case study, has 
three different scores based on mission: 54 for look operations, 53 for lift operations, and 
62 for strike operations.281 Using the formula outlined above, the Bristol Fighter look 
formula is: (intelligence*priority 1) + (loiter time*priority 2) + (communication*priority 
3) + (24 hour capable*priority 4) + (required support*priority 5) = score.282 In number 
form this is (4*1) + (6*2) + (3*3) + (6*4) + (1*5) = 54.283 Once each aircraft has been 
weighted based on commander’s priorities, each aircraft is then ranked where the best 
                                                 
279 See the upper right corner of Table 8, Table 10, and Table 12 for commander priorities for each 
case study. For this paper, each table shares the same commander priorities. Additionally, there is a table at 
the beginning of each case study with the basic capabilities of each aircraft, or the raw data. 
280 See Table 7 for details. 
281 These scores are found in the lower left corner of Table 8, Table 10, and Table 12. 
282 The numbers for priority population are found in the middle of Table 8, Table 10, and Table 12. 
The priorities are outlined in the upper right corner of the same tables. 
283 See Table 8 for details. 
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aircraft gets the lowest score and the worst gets the highest score. The Bristol Fighter in 
this example ranked third for look operations based on available aircraft. 
Each case study has a table that highlights specific capabilities for each aircraft 
that was available for use. This data has been divided into three main categories for 
overall ranking to include mission flexibility, operational environment, and required 
support. Many of the sub-categories can be directly transferred to the commander’s 
priority tables like flight duration example above; however, some of the commander 
priorities must use multiple sub-categories to form an aircraft ranking.284 An example of 
this is the requirement to provide good intelligence. The commander priority list has this 
as a requirement, but this is not a listed capability like flight duration and altitude 
capabilities. Therefore, multiple sub-categories must be combined to form an intelligence 
capable score. In this example mission capability, weather requirements, and the number 
of aircrew formed the intelligence capability composite score. Finally, each case study 
required multiple assumptions. Many of these assumptions are present in each case study, 
but some are case dependent. Thus, I have listed all assumptions for each case study 
within its section understanding it is a little redundant. However, it enables the reader to 
see all assumptions made while looking at the tables of data for each case study. 
Finally, several assumptions have been stipulated for the culmination of this data. 
First, the aircraft environment focuses on conditions important to Afghanistan, and the 
eastern frontier. Altitude becomes very important due to high terrain in the area. Second, 
no consideration was given to aircraft operating from outside Afghanistan in this conflict. 
The Soviets and the U.S. use many aircraft in their campaign from external locations; 
however, the environmental conditional are different for their maintenance, logistics, and 
airfield operations. Additionally, some aircraft that operated internal to Afghanistan were 
excluded in this analysis due to classification of available data, and may have impacted 
the overall calculations. Third, support or logistics are considered a limiting factor in this 
remote land locked environment; however, the Soviets were did share a border with 
Afghanistan, and may have been less limited. Forth, some aircraft are listed as all-
                                                 
284 See Appendix A, The Mission in Irregular Warfare, for category and sub-category definitions. The 
sub-categories are different in Appendix A, but their role is the same. 
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weather capable; others are listed as bad-weather capable. Those aircraft listed as bad-
weather capable were considered less capable than those listed as all-weather. Fifth, the 
nation-state Air Force has air superiority; otherwise, there is another near peer actor 
introducing technology in irregular warfare, and the technology introduced needs to be 
adjusted for. Finally, higher crew member count helps mission effectiveness through 
delegation of duties; thus, better communications, accuracy during targeting, recording 
intelligence, and night sortie effectiveness. However, there is a higher support cost for 
maintaining more personnel. 
B. AIRCRAFT SPECIFICATIONS FROM THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR 
Table 7.   Detailed Information for All the Aircraft the British Empire 
Utilized in the Third Anglo-Afghan War 
 
 
Adapted from: Christopher Foss, Jane’s all the World’s Aircraft 1919, 35a-120a; Mason, 








Table 8.   Weighted Aircraft Capabilities Based on Commander’s Priorities 
That May Have Existed during the Third Anglo-Afghan War 
 
 
Based on the weighted data, the Royal Aircraft B.E.2c would be the best look 
aircraft with a score of 41, the Airco D.H.9a would be the best lift aircraft with a score of 
48, and the Handley Page 400 would be the best strike aircraft with a score of 46.5. These 
scores are derived from commander priorities, the operating environment, and the 
weapon systems capability. Therefore, of the available aircraft, these represent a right-
tech solution based on flexibility, environment, support and capability, and the proposed 
commander priorities for this conflict. They represent the most capable aircraft available 








C. AIRCRAFT SPECIFICATIONS: THE SOVIET UNION AFGHANISTAN 
INVASION 
Table 9.   Detailed Information for All the Aircraft the Soviet Union Utilized 
within This Afghanistan Conflict 
 
Adapted from: Janes, Jane’s all the World’s Aircraft (1985). Nelson, Soviet Air Power: 
Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan, 30; Ilyushin Il-76 Candid Long-range 
transport aircraft, Military-today, (accessed July 7, 2015), http://www.military-
today.com/aircraft/ilyushin_il76_candid.htm Antonov An-22 Antei Heavy transport 
aircraft, Military-today, (accessed July 7, 2015), http://www.military-today.com 
/aircraft/an_22.htm Antonov An-12 Tactical transport aircraft, Military-today, (accessed 



















Table 10.   Weighted Aircraft Capabilities Based on Commander’s Priorities 
That May Have Existed during This Soviet Afghanistan Conflict 
 
 
Based on the weighted data, the Antonov An-12 would be the best look and lift 
aircraft with a score of 20 and 28, the Mikhail Leont’yevich Mil Mi-24 would be the best 
strike aircraft with a score of 52. Additionally, one could argue the Mi-24 may be a better 
look platform based on sensor system availability. These scores are derived from 
commander priorities, the operating environment, and the weapon systems capability. 
Therefore, of the available aircraft, these represent a right-tech solution based on 
flexibility, environment, support and capability, and the proposed commander priorities 
for this conflict. They represent the most capable aircraft available for these three 








D. AIRCRAFT SPECIFICATIONS: UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 
CONFLICT 
Table 11.   Detailed Information for Most of the Aircraft the United States 
Utilized within the Afghanistan Conflict 
 
 
Adapted from: Paul Jackson, Jane’s all the World’s Aircraft 2002–2003 (Alexandria, 
VA: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2002); Federation of American Scientists; FAS 
Military Analysis Airpower Overview, (accessed Aug 21, 2015), http://fas.org/man/dod-

















Table 12.   Weighted Aircraft Capabilities Based on Commander’s Priorities 




Based on the weighted data, the AC-130 would be the best look and strike 
aircraft, and the Lockheed C-130 would be the best lift aircraft. Additionally, during 
phase four the AC-130 was not available in significant number, suggesting the Fairchild 
Republic A-10 was the best strike asset. Additionally, if a long loiter aircraft was not 
available, with correct sensor equipment, the A-10 was also the next best look asset. 
Finally, while the data shows the C-130 as the best lift aircraft, the C-17 was within one 
point of total weighted analysis suggesting they may be interchangeable. More 
Aircraft  type (Used) look lift strike
AC‐130 Gunship 1 6 1 Importance Look Lift Strike
A‐10 Thunderbolt 3 3 2 1 good intel Carry heavy Very accurate
F‐16 Falcon 12 12 12 2 Long Loiter High Alt Air and/or ground
F‐15E Strike Eagle 13 13 13 3 good comm. pax and/or cargo Day and night ops
CH‐47 Chinook 4 5 7 4 Day and night ops Day and night ops Long Loiter
OH‐58 Kiowa 10 10 9 5 Low required spt Low required spt Low required spt
AH‐1 Super Cobra 8 9 3
AH‐64 Apache 9 8 4
UH‐60 Black Hawk 6 7 5
V‐22 Osprey 11 11 11
C‐130 Hercules 2 1 6
C‐17 Globemaster 5 2 8
C‐5 Galaxy 7 4 10
Aircraft  type (Used) loiter time lift capacity  wpns capacity gun capacity Pax/Cargo Altitude Intell comm 24 hour ops capable Accuracy Support
AC‐130 Gunship 3 4 1 1 8 7 1 1 5 6 7
A‐10 Thunderbolt 11 9 4 4 13 3 9 12 3 2 1
F‐16 Falcon 12 8 3 10 12 2 10 13 11 3 10
F‐15E Strike Eagle 13 6 2 9 11 1 8 11 12 1 11
CH‐47 Chinook 7 5 9 7 4 12 4 4 6 10 6
OH‐58 Kiowa 10 13 7 5 7 13 5 8 13 7 2
AH‐1 Super Cobra 6 12 5 2 10 9 7 9 8 4 5
AH‐64 Apache 9 11 6 3 9 10 6 10 9 5 4
UH‐60 Black Hawk 8 10 8 6 6 11 2 6 10 8 3
V‐22 Osprey 5 7 10 8 5 8 3 5 7 9 13
C‐130 Hercules 4 3 11 11 3 6 11 3 1 11 8
C‐17 Globemaster 2 2 12 12 2 4 12 7 2 12 9
C‐5 Galaxy 1 1 13 13 1 5 13 2 4 13 12
Aircraft  type (Used) look raw data lift raw data Strike Raw Data
AC‐130 Gunship 65 97 72
A‐10 Thunderbolt 84 71 76
F‐16 Falcon 167 142 160
F‐15E Strike Eagle 170 144 166
CH‐47 Chinook 84 95 118
OH‐58 Kiowa 111 122 120
AH‐1 Super Cobra 103 117 91
AH‐64 Apache 110 114 106
UH‐60 Black Hawk 91 105 113
V‐22 Osprey 121 131 151
C‐130 Hercules 72 68 114
C‐17 Globemaster 90 69 119










importantly, of the available aircraft, these represent a right-tech solution based on 
flexibility, environment, support and capability, and the proposed commander priorities 
for this conflict. They represent the most capable aircraft available for these three 
missions internal to theater operations. 
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